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INTRODUCTION

Prostitution may be our oldest profession; fornication is
surely among our oldest crimes. 1 The crime of fornication was a
preoccupation of the legal system in the earliest colonies2 and as
late as the period directly preceding the Revolutionary War occasioned 210 of the 370 criminal prosecutions in one Massachusetts
L Indeed, the word "fornication" derives from the Latin for brothel (/ornix). 1
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1061 (1971). Like most glib beginnings, however, this one
must be somewhat qualified. The Bible, of course, frequently and vigorously condemns
fornication. E.g., Acts 15:20. Fornication was not a common-law crime, but like much
sexual behavior, it could be punished by the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Church of England. M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAw 138 (1951). But, Professor Ploscowe reports, "[T]he
record of the Ecclesiastical Courts in the enforcement of sexual morality was largely one
of failure." Id. For a general and historical discussion of fornication as a crime, see id. at
136-57.
2. Professor Demos, for instance, reports "a steady succession of trials and convictions for sexual offenses involving single persons" in Plymouth Colony. J. DEMOS, A LrITLE
COMMONWEALTH 152 (paperback ed. 1972).
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county. 3 It remains a crime in fifteen states and the District of
Columbia: 4 States have also sought to prevent fornication by
making it Hlegal for unmarried men and women to live together.
Cohabitation in this sense is illegal in sixteen states.n Today
laws regulating fornication and cohabitation are as honored in
the breach as in the observance, 6 and economics has joined lust
as a motive for crime-couples whose pensions or alimony will
be cut off or reduced upon marriage sometimes resort to nonmarital cohabitation. 7 It has been estimated that six to eight
million people are cohabiting without benefit of clergy and that
the number of such couples increased from 1960 to 1970 by over
700 percent. 8
The same period which has seen a higher rate of cohabitation
has also seen considerable and significant litigation which can be
read as casting doubt on the constitutionality of laws regulating
consensual adult sexual activity. The Supreme Court's modern
treatment of that issue began in 1961 with Justice Harlan's prescient dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 9 in which he attacked the constitutionality of a statute making it a crime for married couples to
use contraceptives. When four years later the Court in Griswold
3. The period was 1760 to 1774, the county was Middlesex. Nelson, Emerging Notions
of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 450, 452 (1967).
4. A.LA. CODE tit. 13, § 8-1 (1975); FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26·
2010 (1977); IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (1948) (reenacted by Act of March 27, 1972, ch. 336, §
1, 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws 844); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § is (Michie/Law Co-op. 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1
(1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-20-08 (1976); R.l. GEN.
LAws § 11-6-3 (1969);
CODE § 16-15-60 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (1978):
VA. CODE§ 18.2-344 (1975); W. VA. CoDE § 61-8-3 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 644.15 (West
1958); D.C. CoDE § 22-1002 (1973).
5. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 8-1 (1975); A.LASKA STAT. § 11.40.040 (1970); Amz. REV. STAT.
§ 13-1409 (1978); FLA. STAT. § 798.02 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-6604 (1948) (reenacted by
Act of March 27, 1972, ch. 336, § 1, 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws 844); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §
11-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 23-118 (1974); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, §
16 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1968); MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.335 (1970); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9729-1 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 30-10-2 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-20-10 (1976);
CODE§ 16-15-60 (1976) (definition of fornication includes cohabitation); VA. CODE§ 18.2345 (1975); W. VA. CODE§ 61-8-4 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 944.20 (West 1958) (lewd and
lascivious behavior includes cohabitation that implied sexual intercourse).
6. See note 97 infra.
7. Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62VA. L. REV,
663, 686-87 (1976).
8. Id. (citing Boston Evening Globe, May 26, 1976, at 2, cols. 1-6): M. KING, COHABITATION HANDBOOK 2 (1975). The Census Bureau estimates there has been a 100% increase
since 1970. TIME, Nov. 21, 1977, at 111. Since not all states outlaw fornication or cohabitation, not all these couples are breaking the law. And, of course, a higher incidence of
cohabitation is no sure indication that more couples are breaking fornication laws.
9. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).

s.c.

s.c.
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v. Connecticut 10 ruled that such a statute was indeed unconstitutional as an invasion of a right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment, the search began for the boundaries of that
right. 11 Decisions extending the right to use contraceptives to the
unmarried 12 and establishing a right to abortions 13 heartened
those who believed that the boundaries enclosed at least consensual adult sexual activity. Some lower state courts have nurtured
this hope by striking down sodomy laws on the ground that "the
right of privacy in sexual conduct between consenting adults is
fundamental, " 14 although only two state supreme courts have so
held. 15 Meanwhile, commentators have seized with energy and
enthusiasm on the expansive language in some Supreme Court
opinions and have advocated a liberally defined right of sexual
privacy.1 6
Nevertheless, while the Court has not limned precisely the
perimeters of the right of sexual privacy, it has repeatedly confirmed in dicta the state's right to regulate sexual conduct. 17 And,
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. See, e.g., Symposium on the Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 197 (1965); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv.L. REv.
1, 8-9 (1972).
12. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147, 1151 (1975), revd. sub nom.
State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107,547 P.2d 6 (1976). Accord, State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187,
539 P.2d 207 (1975), revd., 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976).
15. State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200,381
A.2d 333 (1977).
16. E.g., L. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 886-990 (1978); Wilkinson & White,
Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 563 (1977); Note,
The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv.
1613 (1974).
17. In his often cited dissent in Poe, Justice Harlan wrote, "I would not suggest that
adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately practiced." 367 U.S. at 552. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in
Griswold (in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined) noted that the
constitutionality of Connecticut's statutes forbidding adultery and fornication was
"beyond doubt." 381 U.S. at 498. In declining to find that the Constitution "incorporates
the proposition that conduct involving consenting adults only is always beyond state
regulation," the Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), cited
Southern Surety Co. v. Oklahoma, 241 U.S. 582, 586 (1916), "as to fornication." 413 U.S.
at 68 n.15. (The Court was evidently referring to the statement in Southern Surety that
"[a]dultery is an offense against the marriage relation and belongs to the class of subjects
which each state controls in its own way.") Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398-99
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment):
In my view, analysis must start from the recognition of domestic relations as
"an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the
States." . . . The State, representing the collective expression of moral aspirations,
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in a delphic summary affirmance, 18 the Court sustained a threejudge federal court's refusal to declare Virginia's sodomy statute
unconstitutional when applied to active, regular, consensual,
adult, private homosexual relations. 19 That affirmance has been
taken to indicate that the state may indeed significantly regulate
sexual behavior. 20 Most recently, the Court voted seven to two not
to hear a case which might have permitted the Court to ponder
these uncertainties. 21 Certainly the net result of the Court's dicta
and decisions is that no lawyer asked by clients about the constitutionality of a state fornication or cohabitation statute can counsel with confidence.
This Note begins with the indisputable assumption that laws
prohibiting fornication and cohabitation are nowhere explioitly
forbidden by the Constitution. If a right to engage in consensual
adult heterosexual activity exists, it will most convincingly be
inferred from the Court's cases establishing a right of "privacy."
The Note first seeks to discover an adequate definition of privacy
which might lead to a decision whether "privacy" encompasses
the right .to fornicate or cohabit (a right which, for brevity's
sake, we will somewhat imprecisely call the right to, sexual privacy), but it finds no such definition. The Note therefore proceeds to investigate the Court's usual test for fundamental rights,
a test which calls for the Court to look to society's traditions and
has an undeniable interest in ensuring that its rules of domestic relations reflect
the widely held values of its people.
18. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
19. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
20. E.g., Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: Closing the Door to a Funda,
mental Right of Sexual Privacy, 53 DEN. L.J. 553 (1976). But see text accompanying notes
61-69 infra.
21. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 99 S.CT. 734 (1978). Justice Brennan
noted he would grant certiorari; Justice Marshall wrote a dissent. In fact, the case was a
good deal less than an ideal vehicle for a Court which wished to address the problem of
regulating consensual adult sexual activity. Ms. Hollenbaugh, a librarian in a public
library, had been fired for living with the library's janitor and their illegitimate child. The
Court might simply have held, as a district court had held in Mindel v. United States
Civil Serv. Commn., 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970), that the employee's sexual
conduct was simply too unrelated to her work to be a legitimate ground for dismissal,
especially since, as in Mindel, her work had not been unsatisfactory. 99 S.CT. at 737. C'f.
Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975) (rule barring
employment of unwed parents in school system insufficiently related to any legitmate
objective to satisfy equal protection clause); Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371
F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (despite contractual provision that a teacher may be fired
for "immorality," cancellation of a teacher's employment contract on evidence growing
out of her consultation with a doctor about an abortion is an unconstitutional violation of
privacy). Nor was the propriety of laws regulating fornication directly involved, since
Pennsylvania had repealed both its fornication and adultery statutes. 99 S.CT. at 735.
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collective conscience. But those two criteria, the Note argues,
likewise tell us little about any right to sexual privacy. The definitional and historical approaches having failed, the Note must
resort to inquiry by analogy. The Note thus proceeds to state and
test several hypotheses by which the right to sexual privacy might
be justified. The Note contends that what it calls the right to
marital privacy, especially when regarded in the light of the other
kinds of privacy, provides an adequate analogy for a right to
sexual privacy.
But that a right is fundamental does not mean that a law
which conflicts with that right is, ipso facto, unconstitutional, for
such a law is permissible if it is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. The Note examines the state interests which
laws forbidding fornication and cohabitation might serve. The
Note suggests that several of these interests are indeed
"compelling," but that the best evidence-the behavior of the
states which have enacted but rarely enforced these laws-shows
that the laws are hardly necessary to achieve those interests. The
Note ultimately concludes, then, that laws prohibiting fornication and cohabitation are unconstitutional.

I.

THE CREATION OF AN AMBIGUOUS RIGHT

To chronicle the development of the Court's decisions on
sexual and familial privacy would be wasteful and ridiculous excess: it has often been done before. 22 Nevertheless, a glance at a
few of the salient cases is necessary to discover whether the Court
has developed a definition we could simply consult to learn
whether consensual adult heterosexual activity is constitutionally
protected. However, while that glance reveals no such definition,
it does reveal some origins of the ambiguities of the right to sexual
privacy and the concerns and uncertainties which underlie the
Court's privacy opinions, and which must inform our evaluation
of any right to sexual privacy.

A.

The Background

A specter haunted the Griswold Court-the specter of
Lochner. Lochner u. New York, 23 of course, is the celebrated case
in which the Supreme Court declared a New York law limiting
bakery employees' working hours an unconstitutional interfer22. E.g., L. TruBE, supra note 16, at 886-990; Wilkinson & White, supra note 16; Note,
On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670 (1973).
23. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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ence with the right to contract: "The general right to make a
contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the
individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." 24 The case symbolizes what is now commonly
perceived as a misuse of the fourteenth amendment and of the
power of judicial review to annul legislation inimical to the
Court's social and economic beliefs even where that legislation
offends no explicit constitutional provision.2.,; Critics of Lochner
thought it dangerous not simply because it seemed insecurely
grounded in the Constitution, but because of the practical difficulties of identifying the kinds of rights the fourteenth amendment does protect, its consequently limitless reach, and the considerable power that reach gives the Court. Thus Justice Black,
who had left the United States Senate for the Court in 1937, when
Lochner was a live and bitter memory to liberal politicans, characterized the formulas used to identify fourteenth amendment
rights as reincarnations of old "natural justice" notions, 28 and he
summoned up Justice Iredell's 1798 attack on that doctrine:
24. 198 U.S. at 53.
25. This roughly paraphrases Justice Holmes's dissenting remarks in Baldwin v,
Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1930). Justice Holmes did not deny that the fourteenth
amendment could be the basis for an attack on a law if it could be said "that a rational
and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law."
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For an example of
the Court's own criticism of Lochner, see Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
421, 423 (1952), where, after referring to Lochner, the Court said, "Our recent decisions
make plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation."
But see Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some lnter.~ections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 231-32 (1968):
It might be argued that, if the function of the Court is truly to afford our society
an opportunity for "sober second thought" concerning measures that challenge, in
some significant way, either cherished ideals or deep-rooted social beliefs, then the
actions of the thirties [the high-water mark of economic substantive due process]
were thoroughly in accord with that function . . . . [T]he effect of the Court's
decisions was precisely to impress upon the society the magnitude of the departure
from received tradition entailed by acceptance of the view that there exist no
principled checks on governmental economic actions . . . • Even on a less longrange view, it is apparent that the Court's 1930's decisions performed the task of
legitimation that the cumbersomeness of the machinery for amending the Constitution has historically imposed upon the Court. Thus, the public consensus on the
propriety of the economic legislation of the 1930's was ultimately strengthened, not
weakened, as a result of the Court's intervention.
26. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). See
generally L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten
Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN, L. REV,
843 (1978).
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The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the
ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all
that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that
the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed
an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with
the abstract principles of natural justice. 27

In short, the substantive due process doctrine symbolized by
Lochner invited an extension of judicial power bordering on usurpation, and many felt the Court accepted the invitation in invalidating New Deal legislation in the 1930s. 28
The modern Court's problem, in light of Lochner and its kin,
was to formulate a statement of the right of privacy (1) with a
sturdy constitutional foundation and (2) expressed in language
broad enough to dignify and secure a "fundamental" right but
narrow enough to provide principled limits to the growth of the
concept.29 The two requirements, of course, are interrelated. A
sharp delineation of the constitution.al authority for the right of
privacy may furnish the necessary principles for controlling the
right's growth. And logic broad enough to appear to our sense of
the nation's basic values but convincingly and safely limited may
make the constitutional argument more persuasive.
Formulating any right from the doctrine of substantive due
process would have been difficult, but formulating the right of
privacy was especially so. The first criterion-constructing the
sturdy constitutional foundation-had more than its usual perplexities, as we shall see. But especially, once the Court decided
to describe the right to freedom from interference with the intimate affairs of one's life (insofar, of course, as that is a "right")
under the deceptively simple and irresistibly appealing rubric
"privacy," it intensified its problems with the second criterion.
First, the Court had chosen a word whose popular connotations
did not always coincide with its legal denotations. 30 Second, the
Court had already used the word in several other contexts. 31
Third, partly because of the two previous characteristics,
"privacy becomes too greedy a legal concept," as Paul Freund has
27. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,399 (1798), quoted in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 525 (1965).
.
28. For background and citations to further material, see L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at
427-55.
29. "An unrestricted concept is perhaps no concept at all." Gerety, Redefining
Privacy, 12 liARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 261 (1977).
30. For an example of the consequences of this fact, see text at note 59 infra.
31. See, e.g., the categories analyzed in Bostwick, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose,
Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1447 (1976).
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written, one which "might give excessive protection to an interest
in human dignity and sensitivity." 32 Whatever the difficulties of
meeting the first requirement may commonly be, in the case of
the right of privacy the search for broad yet safely limited language and logic-in short, for a limiting principle-has been the
overriding task.
These ambiguities and complexities, then, make the contours of the right of privacy unusually obscure. This Note's quest
is to learn whether a right of privacy meeting the two criteria
described above would encompass nonmarital heterosexual activity.

B. A Discursive History of the Right
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Griswold sought to
exorcise the ghost of Lochner by explicitly declining any invitation to be guided by that case, 33 by explaining in non-Lochner
terms precedents founded on Lochner principles, 34 and by concluding that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance"; 35 in particular that the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and (evidently) ninth amendments "create zones of
privacy."36 Justice Douglas's device may seem to anchor substantive due process cases more firmly in a constitutional text, but it
may not offer the specific standards needed to provide plausible
limits to the right of privacy: rights emerging from the shadowy
peripheries of more specific rights often evade exact definition;
vivid but vague expressions like "zones of privacy" are snares for
the analytically unwary; 37 "privacy," as Justice Black complained, "is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept which can
. . easily be interpreted as . . . many things . . ."; 38 and two
32. Freund, Privacy, in PRIVACY 192 (1971).
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965).
34. 381 U.S. at 482-83.
35. 381 U.S. at 484.
36. 381 U.S. at 484.
37. Cf. text at notes 226-28 infra (criticizing analysis in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
38. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee
another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning.
381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting.)
The privacy cases pose the Lochner problem poignantly for many justices and commentators who find the legislation under review particularly obnoxious. As Justice Black
protested in his dissent in Griswold, "I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am
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of the leading components of privacy...:....the right to individual
autonomy and the right to control the disclosure of information
about one's self-would, sufficiently extended, foreclose government regulation of the individual altogether. Since Justice Douglas sought to justify an expansion of the Constitution's protection,
he marshalled the grandest possible language, but the grander
the language, the more irresistible becomes a limitless extension
of the principles of the case.
The next major case in the sexual privacy sequence,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 39 did little to clarify the ambiguities of
Griswold. Baird affirmed the reversal of a proponent of contraception's conviction under a statute making it a crime to give
away any drug or article for the prevention of conception except
to a married person under the prescription of a physician. Applying the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Court found that no "ground of difference . . . rationally explains
the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons" under the Massachusetts statute. 40 Much of the opinion is
addressed to demonstrating that the statute's purpose could not
be to serve the state's interest in prohibiting fornication or preserving public health; the intriguing differences between tlie facts
of Griswold and Baird were less thoroughly handled. First, emanations from the fourth amendment's guarantees against unreasonable searches had helped justify the decision in Griswold,
where Justice Douglas, after stressing that amendment's protection "against all the governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life,' " 41 asked rhetorically,
"Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?" 42
But in Baird the arrest was made on a public platform at the close
of a speech. 43 Indeed, to Justice Douglas, it was "a simple First
Amendment case" of protected speech. 44
nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited
by some specific constitutional provision." 381 U.S. at 510.
39. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
40. 405 U.S. at 447.
41. 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
42. 381 U.S. at 485.
43. 405 U.S. at 457 (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. 405 U.S. at 455 (Douglas, J., concurring). "Handing an article under discussion
to a member of the audience is a technique known to all teachers . . . . I do not see how
we can have a Society of the Dialogue, which the First Amendment envisages, if timehonored teaching techniques are barred to those who give educational lectures." 405 U.S.
at 460.
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Second, Griswold concerned a law which, "in forbidding the
use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or
sale, seeks to achieve its goals" by overbroad means. 4G The law in
Baird regulated the sale of contraceptives. 46 Finally, the opinion
in Griswold relied greatly on the special qualities of the marital
relationship, which Justice Douglas's encomium described as
ancient, sacred, and noble. 47 If these qualities are what place
marriage in the zone of protected privacy, are they not a "ground
of difference" which might explain the disparate treatment accorded married and unmarried couples? 48 The Court in Baird
conceded the difficulty, but explained it away in a· manner suggesting that the phrase "right of privacy" had ceased to be a mere
collection of emanations and taken on independent life. As Justice Brennan wrote for the Court (in a passage to be quoted in
almost every subsequent argument for an expanded right of sexual privacy):
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association
of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 40

This last sentence introduced a tantalizing new element of the
right to privacy, the right to autonomy in decisions about matters
that fundamentally affect one's life. This is obviously a limited
right, else there could be little scope for government, but the
opinion did not identify those limits. In short, Baird's detachment from the rationale of Griswold and its emphasis on the right
45. 381 U.S. at 485 (emphasis original).
46. 405 U.S. at 440-41.
47. 381 U.S. at 486.
48. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standard.~: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 296 (1973).
49. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis original). The Court reports that the appellants in a
later case, Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977), argued that since
Griswold only considered a law governing use, and since Eisenstadt was decided under

the equal protection clause, "neither case should be treated as reflecting upon the State's
power to limit or prohibit distribution of contraceptives to any persons, married or unmar•
ried." 431 U.S. at 686. According to the Carey Court, "The fatal fallacy in this argument
is that it overlooks the underlying premise of those decisions that the Constitution protects
'the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion . • •
into the decision whether to bear or beget a child.'" 431 U.S. at 678 (quoting Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
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to make fundamental decisions clouded the constitutional origins
of the privacy right and opened the door to considerable extensions of it.
In 1973 the Court in Roe v. Wade 50 confronted the emotional
and active political controversy over state abortion laws and, with
a stroke of the pen, sought to resolve it. Whatever may be said of
the almost statutorily detailed description of the state's power to
regulate abortions, and whatever may be said of the Court's
lengthy history of abortion legislation, 51 it cannot be said that the
Court's definition of the privacy rights of a woman seeking an
abortion clarified the dimensions of the right of privacy generally.
After citing cases demonstrating that "the Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas
or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution, " 52 and after
noting that "the right has some extension to activities relating to
marriage . . . procreation . . . contraception . . . family relationships . . . and child rearing and education, " 53 the Court abruptly_ held:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. 54

The brief ensuing (and apparently explanatory) remarks emphasized the distress of the woman who bears an unwanted child. If
this was meant to justify a privacy right, it was inadequate, since
all social regulation imposes distress, if only by preventing people
from doing as they wish. A privacy right exists not because people
would suffer distress without it, but because the distress is a kind
which the Constitution protects people from having to suffer. 55
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. For criticisms of both of these aspects of the opinion, see, e.g., Ely, The Wages
of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920 (1973).
52. 410 U.S. at 152.
53. 410 U.S. at 152-53.
54. 410 U.S. at 153.
55. Roe has been widely criticized on this score. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 51, at 93132: "[T]he Court provides neither an alternative definition nor an account of why it
thinks privacy is involved. It simply announces that the right to privacy 'is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' Nor is
criticism confined to commentators. Justice White, dissenting in Roe and its companion
case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973), wrote: "I find nothing in the language or
history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions
and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers . . . ." Justice Rehnquist
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Thus in Roe the Court identified the constitutional origin of the
right of privacy as the fourteenth amendment without making the
outlines of that right much plainer.
However, in the same term in which the Court enlarged
"privacy" in Roe, it was staking limits to the concept in an obscenity case, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton. 56 The Court held
that there is no privacy right to watch obscene movies in a public
theater, though the Court did not overrule its announcement in
Stanley v. Georgia57 of a right to have such movies in one's home.
The Court in Paris analyzed the privacy right as encompassing
"the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage,
motherhood, procreation, and child-rearing." 58 The Court allowed
the nonconstitutional connotations of "privacy" to affect constitutional interpr~tation when it rationalized the refusal "to compare a theater open to the public for a fee, with the private home
of Stanley . . . and the marital bedroom of Griswold ... " by
noting that the Court "has, on numerous occasions, refused to
hold that commercial ventures such as a motion-picture house are
'private' for the purpose of civil rights litigation and civil rights
statutes." 59 The classification of theaters under civil rights laws,
however, tells us little about the -usefulness of the comparison
with the home or bedroom. In a subsequent footnote, the Court
depreciated the importance of places in determining the range of
constitutional privacy which, the Court said, "is not just concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate
relationship. Such protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right of intimacy involved." 60 But if Paris represented
the Court's unwillingness to develop analogies to the zones of
privacy surrounding the home and the marital bedroom and its
willingness to confine the right of privacy to "personal intimacies" or "intimate relationships," the case provided the Court no
opportunity to comment on what might constitute a personal
intimacy or an intimate relationship, or the degree to which either might be protected.
Such an opportunity was presented and declined in Doe v.
joined Justice White's dissent and, writing for himself, had difficulty understanding how
the right of privacy was involved in Roe. 410 U.S. 113, 172.
56. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
57. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
58. 413 U.S. at 65.
59. 413 U.S. at 65.
60. 413 U.S. at 66 n.13.
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Commonwealth's Attorney. 61 Doe was an action by homosexuals
for a declaratory judgment that Virginia's sodomy law was unconstitutional. A three-judge federal district court denied relief, and
the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. Both the Justices
and the commentators have disputed precisely what that summary affirmance means. Some commentators have proposed that
the case was decided solely on standing or ripeness grounds, 62 a
suggestion perhaps made plausible by the Court's observation in
Carey v. Population Services International that "the Court has
not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to
what extent th~ Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating
[private consensual sexual] behavior among adults." 83 But in his
dissent in Carey, Justice Rehnquist responded, "While we have
not ruled on every conceivable regulation affecting such conduct,
the facial constitutional validity of criminal statutes prohibiting
certain consensual acts has been definitively established. Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney . . . . " 84
Even if we knew that the Doe Court was directly affirming
the lower court's opinion, we would know little, since that opinion
is singularly uninformative. It quoted at length Justice Harlan's
dissent in 1961 in Poe v. Ullman, 85 especially those passages contrasting "the intimacy of husband and wife" with homosexuality
and other sexual "intimacies which the law has always forbidden
and which can have no claim to social protection. " 88 The court's
61. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affg. mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge
court).
62. "It may well be argued, in future discussions of Doe, that the plaintiffs' relatively
weak showing of ripeness and standing-none of the plaintiffs was indicted or convicted-prompted the Supreme Court majority to affirm without hearing arguments or
handing down an opinion." Gerety, supra note 29, at 280 n.172. See generally Note, Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 123 (1976); Comment, supra note 20.
63. 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977).
64. 431 U.S. at 678 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Summary affirmances are precedents, as Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-44
(1975), holds, but they are "not of the same precedential value as an opinion of this Court
treating the question on the merits." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). In
particular, the reasoning of the lower court is not necessarily confirmed by a summary
affirmance. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
65. 367 U.S. at 522.
66. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (E.D. Va. 1975) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
553 (1961)) (emphasis added by the district court). The court continued:
Justice Harlan's words are nonetheless commanding merely because they were
written in dissent. To begin with . . . they were authentically approved in Griswold
[where part of the-quotation used by the court was approvingly cited in Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion]. Moreover, [Justice Harlan] was not differing with
the majority [in Poe] on the merits of the substantive case but only as to the
procedural reason of its dismissal. At all events, the Justice's exegesis is that of a
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opinion did not ask whether the development of the right of privacy in Griswold, Baird, and Roe v. Wade might cause one to
reconsider the dicta of a superseded dissent, however prescient
and distinguished. 67 The court's flat assertion that homosexuality
"is obviously no portion of marriage, home or family life" ignored
possible analogies with "marriage, home or family life" 68 and the
other aspects of privacy the Supreme Court has identified. 69 In
sum, given the many uncertainties surrounding the summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, it establishes no
clear, reliable, limiting principles to the right of privacy.
The Court, we have seen, has associated concerns such as
marriage, the family, and procreation with the right of privacy.
But the .Court has found no definition of privacy which might
guide an inquiry into whether a particular activity is so related
to those concerns that it comes within a constitutionally protected zone of privacy.
II.

PRIVACY AND FuNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

A. The Test for Fundamental Rights
The foregoing discussion of the Court's attempts to define
"privacy" illustrates the difficulties in identifying limiting principles of Freund's "greedy" concept. 70 The device on which constitutional analysis primarily relies to separate the trivial from the
protected is a device required by the principles commonly used
to interpret the fourteenth amendment. The device is in the form
of an argument, spelled out with some precision in Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman. 71 It runs as follows. The fourteenth
amendment speaks in terms of process and might therefore require only procedural fairness. 72 But the Court has not interpreted
the amendment so narrowly:
Were due process merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to
reach those situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the
jurist of widely acknowledged superior stature and weighty whatever its context,
403 F. Supp. at 1201. It is hard to determine in what sense Justice Harlan's comments
were "authentically approved in Griswold." Justice Goldberg was writing a concurring
opinion for himself and two other justices.
67. See Comment, supra note 20.
68. See Part 11.B.4 infra.
69. See Parts 11.B.3 & 11.B.5 infra.
70. Freund, supra note 32, at 192.
71. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).
72. 367 U.S. at 540.
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future could, given even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals, nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all
three. 73

But the fourteenth amendment is not just "a shorthand reference
to what is explicitly set out elsewhere in the Bill of Rights. " 74 The
reach of fourteenth amendment due process is spelled out by
"those concepts which are considered to embrace those rights
'which are . . . fundamental; which belong . . . to the citizens
of all free governments,' for 'the purposes [of securingl which
men enter into society.' " 75 But "[d]ue process has not been
reduced to any formula." 76
The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's
decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. . . . The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by
this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which
it broke. That tradition is a living thing. 77

Another influential statement of the mechan_ism for identifying
rights protected by the due process clause is found in Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut. 18
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left
at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private J:!.Otions. Rather, they must look to the "traditions and [collective]
conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is "so
rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental." The inquiry
is whether a right involved "is of such a character that it cannot
be denied without violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions'. . . ." 79

A final, frequently cited formulation of the test is Justice Harlan's in his concurring opinion in Griswold: "[T]he proper constitutional inquiry . . . is whether this . . . statute infringes the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
enactment violates
basic values 'implicit in the concept of or,_
dered liberty' . . . . "so
_
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

367
367
367
367
367
381
381
80. 381

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at 541.
at 541.
at 541 (emphasis original) (citations omitted).
at 542.
at 542.
479, 486 (1965).
at 493 (citations omitted).
at 500 (citations omitted).
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This admonition to consult history and a Jungian collective
conscience is a conjuration against one of the hobgoblins of
Lochner-judicial subjectivism 81 -but its efficacy is dubious.
There is a long and honorable American tradition of invoking
history to justify social and legal programs, 82 and the Court must,
of course, rationalize past principles and presen~ policies. 83 But
for identifying aspects of privacy worthy of constitutional protection, nothing in "history" is so precise or uncontroverted as to
provide reliable guidance. 84 As Justice Black mordantly comJustice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Griswold apparently relies not on the theory
outlined above, but on the proposition that the Bill of Rights is made applicable to the
states by the fourteenth amendment and that the emanations of the Bill of Rights are
likewise applicable. Justice Harlan interpreted and criticized the opinion by Justice Douglas:
[W]hat I find implicit in the Court's opinion is that the "incorporation" doctrine
may be used to restrict the reach of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. For me
this is just as unacceptable constitutional doctrine as is the use of the
"incorporation" approach to impose upon the States all the requirements of the Bill
of Rights as found in the provisions of the first eight amendments and in the
decisions of this Court interpreting them.
. . . While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.
381 U.S. at 500 (emphasis original). The question whether the fourteenth amendment
incorporates the entire Bill of Rights has not been finally resolved, but the fundamental
rights approach outlined in the text has become the means by which the Court typically
discovers protected privacy rights. This seems to be what the Court was suggesting in Roe
v. Wade:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.
410 U.S. at 153. Thus while the Court may use portions of the Bill of Rights to help identify
values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," it follows the process outlined by
Justice Harlan to discover liberties protected by the due process clause. Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1977) (plurality opinion).
It is worth noting that even Justice Douglas's opinion in Griswold implicitly embraced
the proposition that tradition, history, and our collective conscience help define the due
process clause: "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage . . • is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions." 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965),
81. Thus Justice Harlan wrote, "If the supplying of content to this Constitutional
concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges
have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them." Poe v, Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (dissenting). Similarly, we have seen that Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold noted: "In determining which rights are fundamental, judges
are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions," 381 U.S.
479, 493 (1965).
82. See, e.g., C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 180-81 (1969).
83. See id. at 193.
84. Even leaving aside all the modem doubts about whether history has any discover-
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mented, "['Ijhe scientific miracles of this age have not yet produced a gadget which the Court can use to determine what traditions are rooted in the '[collective] conscience of our people.' " 85
In fact, the most common "historical" technique is simply to list
the major privacy cases with brief notations of the rights they are
thought to recognize. 88 The most extensive and purely historical
inquiry is Justice Blackmun's excursion in Roe v. Wade, 81 an
application of the "history and collective conscience" test that
suggests some reasons for the Court's restrained enthusiasm for
it. One imponderable, when seeking to divine the collective conscience and tra~itions of our people, is which conscience, which
traditions? Justice Blackmun's opinion in Ro·e devotes approximately fourteen pages to demonstrating that abortion laws "are
of relatively recent vintage . . . deriv[ing] from statutory
changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th
century." 88 To Justice Blackmun, the significance of this was,
apparently, that "at the time of the adoption of our Constitution
. . . a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate
a pregnancy than she does in most States today."89 To Justice
Rehnquist:
The fact that a majority of the states reflecting, after all, the
majority sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century is a strong indication . . . that the
asserted right to an abortion is not "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 80

To Justice Blackmun, the relative novelty of abortion legislation
made irrelevant the passage of laws regulating abortion in each
of the fifty states. But to Justice Rehnquist, "the very existence
of the debate [over abortion] is evidence that the 'right' to an
able meaning, the history of the Court's use of history is not specially comforting. See
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119. And lest one
should suppose that that misuse is unique to the judicial mind, one should examine D.
FISHER, HISTORIAN'S FALLACIES (1970). (Fisher does not suppose that history is without its
uses, and his book is hopefully subtitled TowARD A Lome OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT, but his
acidulous comments on distinguished historians are cautionary.)
85. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 519 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
86. E.g., Carey v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion). An exception is Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in Moore, which was written to underscore the "cultural
myopia" of the statute in question and which explored the history and sociology of the
extended family in America. 431 U.S. at 506.
87. 410 U.S. 113, 129-43 (1973).
88. 410 U.S. at 129.
89. 410 U.S. at 140.
90. 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., disenting).
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abortion is not so universally accepted as the appellant would
have us believe. " 91
Justice Rehnquist surely has the better of the argument as
framed by Justice Blackmun-if we ask what the traditions and
conscience of our people, as expressed in our laws, say about
abortion, is not the most recent century the mo~t relevant, and
is not a century of clear legislation enough? But ifwe ask whether
our traditions and conscience include a sense of the inviolability
of one's person, or the conviction that people ought to be free to
choose whether to have children, the holding in Roe v. Wade is
easier to defend. In other words, we must consult general underlying values rather than the specific legislation which provoked the
constitutional challenge. This of course requires a disturbingly
problematic search for nonlegislative evidence of our tradition
and conscience, but without such a flexible, multi-faceted inquiry, the dimensions of constitutionally protected privacy
would be far more cramped than the cases permit, and the
"living Constitution" would have a tenuous hold on life. The
need for sensitive, wide-ranging inquiry into traditions is
especially pressing in privacy cases, since perceptions about what
is private and intimate change with the era and the culture. 92
Further, a simple majoritarian, count-the-statutes solution is a
particularly inapt gauge of the legitimacy of a privacy right, since
constitutional privacy guards the right to make choices in the
protected area without the knowledge, or at least without the
supervision, of the majority-that the majority wishes to intervene should not be dispositive, nor has it been in cases like Roe
v. Wade.
The problems sketched in the preceding paragraph suggest
the extreme difficulties of any attempt to locate in our national
conscience or tradition some strain that would constitutionally
discredit laws regulating consensual, adult, private, heterosexual
activity. There have been laws making fornication criminal since
our national memory runneth not to the contrary. 93 Yet, by the
end of the colonial period, even jurisdictions like Massachusetts,
which had prosecuted fornicators with single-minded vigor, 94 had
substantially abandoned such prosecutions. 95 One doubts that
Bay Staters had become chaste: Professor Shorter reports
91. 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. See, inter alia, D. F'LAHERTY, PruvACY IN COLONIAL AMErucA 19 (1972).
93. See text at notes 1-3 supra.
94. See note 3 supra.
95. Nelson, supra note 3, at 456.
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that from 1750-1850 "the number of out-of-wedlock pregnancies
... skyrocket[ed]" throughout the Western world, indicating a
pervasive increase in nonmarital sex and constituting "one of the
central phenomena of modem demographic history." 96 If a law is
more honored in the breach than in the observance, what is the
tradition? 97 On the other hand, if these laws genuinely have
lapsed into desuetude and disrepute, why are they not repealed?
An investigation of the traditions respecting fornication and cohabitation laws thus reveals only inarticulate traditions and an
ambivalent conscience.

B. Possible Rationales for "Sexual Privacy" as a Fundamental
Right
We have seen that if there is a right to engage in nonmarital,
heterosexual activity, it is a peculiarly Court-created right whose
dimensions cannot profitably be sought in either the constitutional text or in history. 98 Consequently, the most reliable way to
establish whether it "exists" may be to compare the kinds of
personal interests in such behavior with the kinds of interests
already protected by the Court. The Court's own technique,
after all, has usually been to leap from historical speculations
to a recitation· of the privacy cases, to an estimate of whether
the right sought is in some sense proportionate or proximate to
the listed rights. 99 Occasionally the Court generalizes briefly, 100
96. E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE l\40DERN FAMILY 83 (1975).
97. The law against fornication, when it has not been repealed, has fallen into
decline, withering away under the impact of mass open defiance, lack of prosecution
and enforcement, a complete absence of public support, and apathy toward the law
(including ignorance of it) on the part of the violators.
D. MACNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME AND THE LAw 187 (1977). "Unlike the laws on
fornication and adultery, those prohibiting open and lewd cohabitation have been enforced with occasional vigor, although usually selectively, discriminatorily, and arbitrarily. Such legal actions have become rare . . • ." Id. at 193.
98. Which is not to say, of course, that such a right does not exist. For a critical review
of other possible methods of "discovering" a constitutional right; see Ely, The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1978).
99. See Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1174 (1974). For typical passages, see Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685
(1977), Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976), and Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1973).
100. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) ("[e]ach of those cases involved a substantial claim of
infringement on the individual's freedom of choice with respect to certain basic matters
of procreation, marriage and family life"); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S: 693, 713 (1976); Paris
Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) ("[t]his privacy right encompasses and
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but as it conceded in Paul v. Davis, privacy cases defy categorical
description.1°1 This Note will, nevertheless, next attempt to isolate and examine the several arguments which might be made to
justify the proposition that private, consensual, adult, heterosexual behavior is protected by the Constitution.
1. Emanations of the Fourth Amendment
Hypothesis: It may be inferred from Griswold v. Connecticut that
some acts are so intimate and personal that they could be discovered (and thus regulated) by the government only through means
offensive to the principles underlying the fburth amendment, and
that those acts therefore fall within a zone of privacy.

"Secluded from the sight, presence, or intrusion of others"102-this phrase defines the colloquial meaning of "private,"
a meaning that is constitutionally acknowledged by a line of cases
emanating from the fourth amendment's prohibition of
"unreasonable searches and seizures." 103 The most sweeping language in these cases is among the earliest. It is from Justice
Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 104 where, in deprecating "an unduly literal construction" 105 of the fourth amendment, he wrote:
The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 108

The Court's opinion in Griswold depended heavily upon fourth
protects the personal intimat.!ies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing").
101. 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). "Even reading the cases cited [in Roe] 'for all they
are worth,' it is difficult to isolate the 'privacy' factor (or any other factor that seems
constitutionally relevant) that unites them with each other and with Roe." Ely, supra note
51, at 932.
102. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1042 (1969).
103. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
104. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928). The unduly literal interpretation was that wire-tapping
was not a search or seizure. The government had conceded that were wire-tapping a search
or seizure, the instance in Olmstead would have been unreasonable.
105. 277 U.S. at 476.
•
106. 277 U.S. at 478.

December 1978]

Note-Cohabitation

273

amendment cases 107 and language. 108 But there were other possible
grounds for the decision in Griswold, and as the Court has expanded the right of privacy it has decreasingly relied on (to the
point of ignoring) emanations of the fourth amendment. 109 For
instance, the Court can now suggest that a ban on sales of contraceptives (which could presumably be enforced without injuring
fourth amendment principles) "since more easily and less offensively enforced [than a ban on their use], might have an even
more devastating effect upon the freedom to choose contraception. "110 And even in cases which fall more precisely within the
ambit of the right to prevent disclosure of information about one's
life and behavior, the Court seems reluctant to read the cases and
law expansively. Thus, in upholding a New York statute which
required that the state receive a copy of every prescription for
certain drugs, 111 the Court discounted a claim that "a constitutional privacy right emanates from the Fourth Amendment" by
commenting that "those cases involve affirmative, unannounced,
narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy during the
course of criminal investigations." 112
Several considerations probably account for the Court's reluctance to develop Griswold's fourth amendment aspects and for
the irrelevance of those aspects to our problem of laws prohibiting
fornication and cohabitation. The distastefulness of any search
107. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
108. "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms
for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?" 381 U.S. at 485.
109. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 684-87 (1977). In his
dissent in Poe, Justice Harlan foresaw the limitations inherent in tying the right of privacy
closely to the fourth amendment: "It would surely be an extreme instance of sacrificing
substance to form were it to be held that the Constitutional principle of privacy against
arbitrary intrusion comprehends only physical invasions by the police." 367 U.S. 497,551
(1961). That Griswold is not so limited is argued by Judge Winter:
The marital right of privacy has a base broader than the Fourth Amendment alone
and the cases recognizing the right pitch it on grounds that belie that secrecy is a
necessary element. . • . In Griswold. . . , patients were admitting an outsider into
their marital intimacies by seeking counseling and advice about contraception
Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 354 (4th Cir. 1976) (Winter, J., dissenting).
110. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977). Contrast with this the
language of the Court in Griswold: "The present case . . . concerns a law which, in
forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale,
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon [the
marital] relationship." 381 U.S. at 485.
111. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, (1977).
112. 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977). See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (no
constitutional violation in the circulation to merchants for a flyer listing respondent as a
shoplifter where charges against him had been dismissed).
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for evidence of a violation of fornication laws is, of course, plain.
The image of police bursting into a room to catch a couple in
flagrante delicto and then relating the episode in open court
smacks of a sordid divorce, not enlightened law enforcement.
That is surely what Justice Douglas had in mind when he asked
in Griswold whether we would have police search the sacred precincts of the marital bedroom. 113 But much of what made that
search seem unreasonable in Griswold was the availability of better means of serving the proffered state interest, the "policy
against all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships. . . . " 114 Even if a prohibition against contraceptives actually promotes that end, a ban on sales could be more easily and
less offensively enforced. 115 No such alternatives present themselves as means of enforcing fornication laws. Further, the
searches foreseen in Griswold were only tenuously related to the
law's purpose. Fornication statutes and the statute in Griswold
attack the same harm-nonmarital sexual activity. But a conviction following a search for contraceptives would only result in the
removal of the enticement to sexual promiscuity contraceptives
were thought to present. In contrast, a search for evidence of
fornication would be a search for evidence of precisely the behavior the law ultimately seeks to prevent.
Finally, the Court's desertion of the fourth amendment argument is probably due to the indirectness with which that argument speaks to society's basic, genuine concerns in privacy cases.
The crucial feature of privacy cases is the special quality of the
protected behavior. The fourth amendment does little to identify
any special qualities of sexual activity which call for constitutional protection-they must be inferred from other constitutional sources. Once its special qualities are identified, freedom
to engage in sexual activity can be protected solely on the basis
of those qualities and without relying on the fourth amendment's
emanations. If anything, courts now seem to take this aspect of
privacy more as the terminus ad quem than a quo, as a limit on
the right of privacy rather than a source of it. For instance, in
Lovisi v. Slayton 118 a married couple which had invited a third
113. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
114. 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
115. "A statute limiting its prohibition on use to persons engaging in the prohibited
relationship would serve the end posited by Connecticut in the same way, and with the
same effectiveness, or ineffectiveness •..• " 381 ·u.s. at 507 (White, J., concurring in
the judgment).
116. 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976).
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person to share the intimacies of their bedroom were held to have
waived their right to privacy, since, "[i]f the couple performs
sexual acts for the excitation or gratification of welcome onlookers, they cannot selectively claim that the state is an intruder." 117
2.

The Home as Sanctuary

Hypothesis: It may be inferred from Stanley v. Georgia that the
home is a sanctuary within which the individual may pursue his
intellectual and emotional needs without interference from the
government except where there is demonstrable external harm.

Related to the colloquial definition of privacy, and drawing
constitutional legitimacy from many of the sources discussed in
the preceding Part, is the proposition that some acts are protected when performed within the sanctuary of the home. This
seemed in the early days of the privacy doctrine a promising line
of reasoning, as Justice Harlan implied while analyzing the Connecticut statute which banned the use of contraceptives: "This
enactment involves what, by common understanding throughout
the English-speaking world, must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty,' the privacy of the home in its most
basic sense, and it is this which requires that the statute be subjected to 'strict scrutiny.' " 118 The promise gleamed brightly after
the Court held in Stanley v. Georgia119 that while "the States
retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does
not extend to mere possession [of obscene films] by the individual -in the privacy of his own home.'' 120 The attraction of Stanley
lay in its generous language 121 and in its conclusion that while the
state could normally regulate obscenity without proving "that
exposure to obscene material would create a clear and present
danger of anti-social conduct, " 122 the state could not, given the
paucity _of knowledge about obscenity's harmfulness, prohibit its
possession in the home. 123 Some judges and commentators thus
interpreted Stanley as saying that "socially condemned activity,
117. 539 F.2d at 351.
118. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Despite this
language, Justice Harlan emphasized the home's relationship to privacy rights rather than
the home's function as sanctuary: "The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of
family life." 367 U.S. at 551.
119. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
120. 394 U.S. at 568.
121. "[A]ppellant is . . • asserting the right . . . to satisfy his intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy or"his own home." 394 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
122. 394 U.S. at 567.
123. 394 U.S. at 566-67.
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excepting that of demonstrable external effect, is and was intended by the Constitution to be beyond the scope of state regulation when ·conducted within the privacy of the home. " 124 The
Court, however, has refused to extend Stanley, which it deprecated in 1973 as "hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's
home is his castle' "; 125 in obscenity cases it has confined Stanley
strictly to its facts. 128 ••
Is the adage that a man's home is his castle as trivial as the
Court implied? If we are to gauge the fundamentality of a right
by the "traditions and conscience of our people, " 127 the facility
with which the phrase comes to mind may be evidence to the
contrary. Indeed, the phrase evokes Professor Reich's modern formulation of the centuries-old belief that
[p]roperty performs the function of maintaining independence,
dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones within which the
majority has to yield to the owner . . . . [P]roperty affords dayto-day protection in the ordinary affairs of life. 128

Justice Stewart recently cited the classic and august authority for
the proposition that "rights in property are basic civil rights . . .
J. Locke ... ; J. Adams ... ; [and] W. Blackstone . . . . " 129
And Justice Stevens seemed to be hearkening to this tradition in
his concurring opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland: "In my
judgment the critical question presented by this case is whether
·East Cleveland's housing ordinance is a permissible restriction on
appellant's right to use her own property as she sees fit." 130 In
the light of this tradition, Stanley gains strength: the home becomes a sanctuary in which the individual may explore and express his intellectual and emotional nature, undeterred by society's notions of propriety and orthodoxy, wherever there is no
"demonstrable external effect."
This version of Stanley, however, has several drawbacks as
the source of a right to sexual activity. First, the essential preliminary question is whether the right to privacy in the home is so
fundamental that state interests must be strictly scrutinized.
124. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(Merhige, J., dissenting), af{d. mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
125. Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973).
126. See United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973)
and cases cited in Gerety, supra note 29, at 276 n.164.
127. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
128. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964).
129. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 638, 552 (1972).
130. 431 U.S. 494, 513 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Stanley's answer seems to be that if the state interest is weak, the
right of privacy in the home is fundamental. Since the determinant of the strength of the state interest has largely been the kind
of scrutiny to which it is subjected, 131 one hardly knows where in
this circle to begin.
Second, the exception to the right of privacy where there is
external harm could easily swallow the right; in this case, ironically, it is difficult to identify principled limits to the limits on
the right. In Stanley, external harm could only have been caused
by the corrupting effects of the literature read in the home. The
Stanley Court's understanding of "harm" was probably influenced by the case's first amendment aspects 132 and by the assumption common in first amendment cases that the operation
of the marketplace adequately combats pernicious ideas. But the
possible external harms from even the most sequestered sexual
behavior are quite evident-illegitimate children and venereal
disease. If external harm includes offense to the public's sensibilities or damage to society's "moral fiber," the exception would be
virtually unconfinable. The dimensions of the exception are
blurred by the Court's willingness in Paris Adult Theatre Iv.
Slaton to concede the legislature the right to act on "various
unprovable assumptions" about what is necessary to protect
society's interest in order and morality. 133
131. See Part ill.A. infra.
132. Indeed, if Stanley is read with an eye to its first amendment elements, the
privacy argument practically disappears. The Court began:
Appellant raises several challenges . . . . We find it necessary to consider only one.
Appellant argues . • • that the Georgia obscenity statute . . . violates the First
Amendment, as ma:de applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. For
reasons set forth below, we agree that the mere private possession of obscene matter
cannot constitutionally be made a crime.
394 U.S. at 559. The Court then discussed the leading contemporary obscenity case, Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957): "Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent
•.. erosion [of First Amendment rights]." 394 U.S. at 563. After a paragraph citing
Griswold and Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead, 394 U.S. at 564, the Court stated:
"If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch."
394 U.S. at 565. After adverting again to the right to read and observe what one pleases,
394 U.S. at 568, the Court commented:
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal
Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen
goods, a crime. Our holding in the present case turns upon the Georgia statute's
infringement of fundamental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. No First Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making
mere possession criminal.
394 U.S. at 568 n. 11.
133. 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973).
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Finally, the frailty of the "home/sanctuary" argument is
similar to that of the "fourth amendment emanations" argument:
both fail to identify the special qualities of an activity which
mandate constitutional protection; neither standing alone accounts for the importance accorded "privacy'' by the Court. As
the Court suggested in Paris:
The protection afforded by Stanley . . . is restricted to a place, the
home. In contrast, the constitutionally protected privacy of family,
marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just
concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate
relationship. Such protected privacy extends to the doctor's office,
the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard
the right to intimacy involved. 13'

Is the right to private sexual relations in the home a fundamental right, on a par with family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child-rearing, and part of our traditions and national conscience? Probably not.
3. The Right of Associational Privacy
Hypothesis: It may be inferred from Griswold v. Connecticut and
from dissents in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno and Belle
Te"e v. Boraas that freedom of association, which is a necessary
concomitant to the rights guaranteed by the first amendment, encompasses the fundamental right to choose and live with one's
most intimate associates, one's sexual partners.
.

A constitutionally assured "right of association" has been
inferred by the Court from the first amendment protection of
speech and assembly .135 While in ordinary speech "association"
has broad connotations, "the scope of the associational right . . .
has been limited to the constitutional need that created it; obviously not every 'association' is for First Amendment purposes
or serves to promote the ideological freedom that the First
Amendment was designed to protect." 136 However, Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall have, usually in dissent, interpreted the
right more generously, essentially by liberal use of the first
amendment emanations discerned by Justice Douglas (writing for
the Court) in Griswold. There Justice Douglas cited the Court's
protection of "forms of 'association' that are not political in the
134. 413 U.S. at 66 n.13.
135. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958).
136. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 535 (Stewart, J., dissenting), For
a proposal for a broader interpretation of the right, see Raggi, An Independent Right to
Freedom of Association, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1977).
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customary sense but pertain to the social, legal, and economic
benefit of the members" 137 as evidence that some penumbra!
rights are necessary to make the express guarantees of the first
amendment "fully meaningful. " 138 He noted that the right of association is one of the constitutional guarantees which create
"zones of privacy." 139 He concluded by describing marriage as "an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions." 140 Thus in Griswold Justice
Douglas described a right of associational privacy resting on a
broad reading of the first amendment's aims and securing freedom from governmental interference with human relationships
serving basic social and personal ends.
The Court's present willingness to apply traditional equal
protection standards with "bite" 141 allowed the_ Court in
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno 142 to postpone deciding
whether this associational right of privacy is "fundamental. In
that case the Court held that a provision of the Food Stamp Act
of 1964 excluding households containing unrelated members violated the equal protection ~arantee of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment by creating an irrational classification. The
Court noted, "Under traditional equal protection analysis, a leg.,,
islative classification must be sustained if the classification itself
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest," 143 and
it found that the classification was not rationally related to the
interest in minimizing fraud. 144 But Justice Douglas's concurring
opinion suggested that while the provislon "might well be sustained simply as a rational means to prevent fraud, " 145 preventing
fraud was not so compelling a governmental interest as to support
137. 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
138. 381 U.S. at 483.
139. 381 U.S. at 484.
140. 381 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added).
141. Gunther, supra note 11, at 20-21.
142. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
143. 413 U.S. at 533.
lM. 413 U.S. at 535-38. The only reference to the privacy issue was a footnote which
reported that the government had argued in the district court that the classification might
foster "morality." 413 U.S. at 535 n.7. The district court had cited Griswold, Stanley, and
Eisenstadt in suggesting that it was doubtful whether this interest would support the
infringement of "the rights to privacy and freedom of association in the home." 345 F.
Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972) (emphasis original). The government did not use the
"morality" argument before the Supreme Court. 413 U.S. at 535 n.7.
145. 413 U.S. at 542.
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an invasion of the fundamental right of association: that right
protects the poor who wish to band together "in households where
they can better meet the adversities of poverty." 148 He compared
that right to other peripheral first amendment rights:
the right to send one's child to a religious school, the right to study
the German language in a private school, the protection of the
entire spectrum of learning, teaching, and communicating ideas,
the marital right of privacy.
. . . [T]hese peripheral constitutional rights are exercised
not necessarily in assemblies that congregate in halls or auditoriums but in discrete individual actions such as parents placing a
child in the school of their choice. Taking a person into one's home
because he is poor or needs help or brings happiness to the household is of the same dignity. 147

Despite the considerable potential of this language, Douglas
wrote the majority opinion in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 14 "
which sustained a zoning ordinance limiting land use to onefamily dwellings and defining "family" to exclude households
with more than two unrelated persons. 149 In one laconic sentence, Douglas denied that any fundamental right, including the
right to privacy, was implicated. The opinion recounted the
contention that the ordinance reflected animosity to unmarried
cohabiting couples, 150 found no evidence for the charge, and said
in a footnote, "Moreno . . . is therefore inapt as there a household containing anyone unrelated to the rest was denied food
stamps." 151 Finally, Justice Douglas detected no interference
with "other forms of association, for a 'family' may, so far as the
ordinance is concerned, entertain whomever it likes." 152
146. 413 U.S. at 541.
147. 413 U.S. at 542.
148. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
149. The action was brought by a group of students and a landlord who had rented
them a house in an area subject to the ordinance. By the time the case reached the Court,
the students had moved out and the case was moot as to them. 416 U.S. at 10 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). The Court heard and decided the case, however, because the landlord was
a party to the action; he had standing to chaJlenge the ordinance because the rent he could
charge for the house depended on how large a group could live there. 416 U.S. at 9. Justice
Douglas's opinion does not make clear whether the landlord could assert the rights of his
ex-tenants, or only his own. In any event, Justice MarshaJI in dissent believed that the
associational rights of the tenants were still in the case. 416 U.S. at 13 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
150. Because the ordinance only barred households with three or more unrelated
persons, unmarried couples were not directly affected.
151. 416 U.S. at 8 n.6.
152. 416 U.S. at 9.
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Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion which is the
clearest judicial statement of an associational privacy right to
choose one's household companions. He began by arguing that
the first amendment limits even zoning laws (which the Court has
traditionally been hesitant to review), since an ordinance confining an area to adherents of a particular political or religious persuasion would be unconstitutional. "Our decisions establish," he
continued, "that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect
the freedom to choose one's associates," 153 and he cited cases extending protection to "modes of association . . . that pertain to
the social and economic benefit of the [union] members." 154 He
reasoned, "The selection of one's living companions involves similar choices as to the emotional, social, or economic benefits to be
derived from alternative living arrangements." 155 He cited privacy
decisions displaying a special concern with the right to establish
and be free in a home (Meyer v. Nebraska, 158 Griswold, and
Stanley), and he added Roe v. Wade, Eisenstadt, Olmstead, and
Moreno to support his conclusion that
[t]he choice of household companions-of whether a person's
"intellectual and emotional needs" are best met by living with
family, friends, professional associates, or others-involves deeply
personal considerations as to the kind and quality of intimate relationships within the home. That decision surely falls within the
ambit of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution. 157

Finally, Justice Marshall invoked Justice Douglas's arguments in
Moreno in dismissing the proposition that the right of association
is satisfied by the freedom to invite guests into the home. 158
The Court again rejected an opportunity to expatiate on the
fundamentality of an associational right of privacy in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland. 159 The facts of that case evoke almost
irresistable sympathy for the appellant. Mrs. Moore was a grandmother living with her son, his son, and another grandson by a
different child. This second grandson had come to live with his
grandmother, uncle, and cousin after his mother's death 180 when
153. 416 U.S. at 15 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963)).
154. 416. U.S. at 15. Justice Marshall cited Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971);
and Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
155. 416 U.S. at 15.
156. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
157. 416 U.S. at 16.
158. 416 U.S. at 17-18.
159. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
160. 431 U.S. at 497.

.
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he was less than a year old. 181 East Cleveland's housing ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to single families and
defined family in such a way as to forbid the Moores' arrangement.182 When Mrs. Moore failed to comply with a notice of violation, she was convicted on a criminal charge, fined $25, and sentenced to five days in jail. 183 Although the appellant based her
claim in part on the right of association, the Court's opinion relied on the long procession of privacy cases stating the family's
privacy rights. Justice Stewart, in a dissent in which Justice
Rehnquist joined, did evaluate the associational privacy argument. Stressing the first amendment origins of that right, 184 he
put Justice Douglas's "penumbra" argument in its most restrictive form: "Freedom of asspciation has been constitutionally recognized because it is often indispensable to effectuation of
explicit First Amendment guarantees." 185 He could find no relationship between the situation in Moore and the first amendment concern for speech, assembly, press, and religion. He disagreed that "the biological fact of common ancestry necessarily
gives related persons constitutional rights of association superior
to those of unrelated persons," 188 and he argued that in any event,
[w]herever the outer boundaries of constitutional protection of
freedom of association may eventually turn out to be, they surely
do not extend to those who assert no interest other than the gratification, convenience, and economy of sharing the same residence. 187

Described in Justice Stewart's disparaging language, and at
its least sympathetic extreme, the right of association does seem
irrelevant to Belle Terre and Moore and does fail to rise to the
dignity of a fundamental right. Nevertheless, fornication and
cohabitation statutes ought at least sometimes to be unconstitutional even in terms of a right of association tied closely to
the first amendment that right emanates from. The proper
ordering of people's most intimate relationships is a social and
political, and often religious, issue of the first importance. The
development and propagation of ideas about such social ordering may require an association of the like-minded, experimenting
161. 431 U.S. at 505 n.16.
162. 431 U.S. at 496.
163. 431 U.S. at 497. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed and the Ohio Supreme
Court denied review. 431 U.S. at 497-98.
164. See text at note 136 supra.
165. 431 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added).
166. 431 U.S. at 535.
167. 431 U.S. at 535-36.
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and setting an example, practicing and preaching. The city
that is set on a hill is an American tradition, one exemplified by
communities of social and religious reformers associated for mutual support in redesigning society and recruiting_ adherents.
Unorthodox marital arrangements, from the continence of the
Shakers, 168 to the polygamy of the Mormons, 169 to the remarkable
sexual cavalcade of Oneida, typify these communities. 110 (It
is worth remarking that each of those was organized according
to and as an expression of profound religious beliefs. 171) In their
more articulate moments, the communes of the 1960s and 1970s
often followed the tradition. 172 This line of argumeijt, of course,
applies best to self-consciously political, social,. and religious
groups. 173 Any extension of the argument to individual couples
would depend on the extent to which the relationship sustained
an essay in social ordering and expressed social or religious beliefs. Such extensions would be hampered by the likelihood that
few cohabitating couples have thought about themselves in
these terms. While this analysis suggests that Justice Stewart's
language may go too far in denying any relationship between
associational privacy and the choice of domiciliary and sexual
partners, it also suggests that associational privacy does not go
far _enough to support a fundamental right to choose such companions.
Is our initial hypothesis thus incorrect? Despite the eloquence of Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall, the Court has
declined Griswold's offer to enhance the scope of the right of
association, implicitly in Moreno and Moore, explicitly in Belle
168. A. TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERll1ENT 147 (1944) (paperback ed. 1962).
169. Id. at 86-107.
170. John Humphrey Noyes, the guru of Oneida
wrote a pamphlet called Slavery and Marriage: "Marriage is not an institution of
the Kingdom of Heaven, and must give place to Communism . . . . The abolishment of exclusiveness is involved in the love-relation required between all believers
in Christ." To this end the community instituted complex marriage. Under this
system every member had sexual access to every other with his or her consent . • .
but always under "strict regulation and governed by spiritual considerations." . . .
As there was a general feeling that the young should learn from the older, more
spiritual members, who had reached a higher level of "fellowship," sexual contacts
usually proceeded along those lines.
R. KANTER, COlllllllTMENT AND COMMUNlTY 12 (1972).
171. In keeping with America's role as a refuge for unorthodox opinion, many of these
utopian communities had come to America from Europe to live and preach. See, e.g., A.
TYLER, supra note 168, at 140-45.
172. E.g., Twin Oaks, described in R. KANTER, supra note 170, at 18-21.
173. But cf. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S.14 (1946) (transportation ofa plural
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Terre. The limiting principle of the right of association, and
what spares the Court the task of applying the compelling-stateinterest test to every government regulation of an "association,"
is the right's first amendment rationale. To accept Griswold's
invitation would probably have been to divorce the right from
any convincing first amendment logic and thus to remove the
right's limiting principle. Given the Court's sensible aversion to
rights without limiting principles and given the precedents in
associational privacy cases, the hypothesis standing alone is
constitutionally unconvincing.
4.

The Right of Familial Privacy

Hypothesis: It may be inferred from Moore v. City of East
Cleveland that the right of familial privacy established by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and cases interpreting
it extends to functional equivalents of the family, including unmarried heterosexual couples. 174

The rights of familial and marital privacy also draw constitutional authority from the right of association, but they are bolstered by other constitutional language and a tradition of constitutional interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. As Justice Goldberg wrote in Griswold,
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly
underiie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order
and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected. 17G

Familial privacy assures more than the unadorned right to raise
a family; that right is accompanied by the right to autonomy in
making decisions about the family. 178 Before we can determine
whether these rights imply a right of unrelated individuals to
organize a non-traditional "family," we must examine the kinds
of behavior the Court has insulated from governmental supervision.
Familial-privacy cases essentially concern "the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children." 177 As one seminal opinion put it:
wife across· state lines constitutes such transportation for an immoral purpose in contravention of the Mann Act).
174. Because of its emphasis on functional equivalents of the family, this hypothesis
could probably apply only to laws prohibiting cohabitation. But see note 216 infra.
175. 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
176. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFieur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory leave of
absence for teacher who becomes pregnant violates Constitution).
177. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 708 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring
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It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder. 178

Thus the classic familial-privacy cases have buttressed the right
of parents to control their children's education by invalidating
laws prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to young children179 and laws requiring children to attend public schools. 180
The Court slightly broadened the scope of familial privacy in
Moore u. City of East Cleveland, 181 where the Court, emphasizing
the "sanctity" of the family and its deep roots in our national
history and mores, announced, "The tradition of uncles, aunts,
cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along
with parents and chil9ren has roots equally venerable and equally
deserving of constitutional recognition [as those of the nuclear
family]." 182 Governmental interference with "choices concerning
family living arrangements" therefore must be strictly scrutinized. 183 The legitimacy of this constitutional recognition of the
extended family becomes apparent when we recall that one reason we guard the family is because it is the institution through
which "we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural" 184 and that decisions concerning rearing children and transmitting values to them have customarily
been shared by the parents with other relatives. A grandmother's
right to live with her two grandchildren is protected because she
serves the parental function of bringing up and socializing the
children.
Moore's slight extension of familial privacy was not made
easily, however. Only four Justices joined in the plurality opinion;
the concurring opinion, written by Justice Stevens, reasoned that
the ordinance impermissibly interfered with the appellant's right
to control her own property and that it therefore was a taking
without due process or just compensation. 185 Chief Justice Burger
dissented because the appellant had not exhausted her adminisin part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
639 (1968)).
178. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
179. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
180. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
181. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
182. 431 U.S. at 504.
183. 431 U.S. at 499.
184. 431 U.S. at 503-04.
185. 431 U.S. at 513-21.
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trative remedies, but he thought the constitutional question difficult.188 Justice Stewart's dissent, to which Justice Rehnquist subscribed, contended that the zoning power approved by the Court
in Euclid u. Ambler Realty Co. 187 and affirmed as to single-family
zoning plans by Belle Terre carried with it the power to define
"family." Recalling that the standard for measuring the "limited
substantive contours" 188 of a due process claim was that the interest be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 189 Justice Stewart wrote, "The interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single kitchen and a suite of contiguous rooms
with some of her relatives simply does not rise to that level." 190
He reviewed cases protecting the family's autonomy and found
little similarity to the appellant's interest: "The ordinance . . .
did not impede her choice to have or not to have children, and it
did not dictate to her how her own children were to be nurtured
and reared. " 191 Justice White's dissent likewise saw no reason why
the "interest in residing with more than one set of grandchildren
is one that 9alls for any kind of heightened protection under the
Due Process Clause." 192
Could Moore's extension of "family" be stretched any
further? Laurence Tribe argues that decisions denying parents
and husbands the right to veto a woman's decision to have an
abortion, 193 when seen in the combined light of the family and
marital privacy cases, the holding in Moreno, 194 and decisions
forbidd1ng disadvantaging of illegitimate children and unwed
-parents195 suggest that
one cannot avoid the conclusion that the stereotypical "family
unit" that is so much a part of our constitutional rhetoric is becoming decreasingly central to our constitutional reality. Such
186. 431 U.S. at 521.
187. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
188. 431 U.S. at 537 (1977).
189. 431 U.S. at 537 (citing Roe v. Wade's quotation of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)).
190. 431 U.S. at 537.
191. 431 U.S. at 536.
192. 431 U.S. at 549.
193. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
194. See text at notes 142-44 supra.
195. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed fathers cannot automatically be presumed unfit); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate child
cannot be disqualified from wrongful death recovery for death of mother); Glona
v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (mother of illegitimate child cannot
be disqualified from wrongful death recovery for death of child) • • • •
L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 987. n.17.

December 1978]

Note-Cohabitation

287

"exercises of familial rights and responsibilities" as remain prove
to be individual powers to resist governmental determination of
who shall be born, with whom one shall live, and what values shall
be transmitted. 196

Even two of the earliest "privacy" cases proclaim the right
of parents to transmit heterodox values to their children 197 and
can be seen as protecting a sanctuary for the preservation of
individual and cultural independence and autonomy. A similar
interest may also be inferred from the comment in Moore that the.
"Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its
children-and its adults-by forcing all to live in certain narrowly
defined family patterns" 198 and from the concurring opinion in
Moore, which was written
to underscore the cultural myopia of the arbitrary boundary drawn
by the East Cleveland ordinance in the light of the tradition of the
American home that has been /l feature of our society since our
beginning as a Nation-[the extended family especially common
in black and ethnic groups). 199

From this perspective, the implication of Moore may be that
the Constitution protects the family because it functions as a
sanctuary in which intimate and important relationships are developed and expressed. If the Constitution's concerp. is the family's function, functional equivalents of the family, including
unmarried couples, ought also to be protected. And the Court in
dictum intimated a willingness to recognize functional equivalents of the family in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 200
where it noted that
the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments
that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the
role it plays in "promoting a way of life" through the instruction
of children ... as well as from the fact of blood relationship. 2111

Nevertheless, is there something about the fact of relatedness which justifies drawing the constitutional line at the
196. Id. 987 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (emphasis origi-

nal).
197. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), protects the parents' right to have the
child taught a language (German) which society has decided represents·a tradition inimical to its interests. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), preserves the parents'
right not to educate their children in that traditional transmitter of our national values,
the public school.
198. 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion).
199. 431 U.S. at 507.
200. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
201. 431 U.S. at 844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)).
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"traditional" family? The appellant in Moore, after all, was not
only in loco parentis, but was so closely related by blood that it
has been traditional for her to occupy that position.
Little in the history of the nation or the cases decided by the
Court is precedent for extending the protection of the family to
individuals not related by blood or marriage. Thus Smith, whose
dicta tentatively equated the traditional family and the foster
family, held that, as against the right of the biological parents,
foster parents lacked the kind of interest which would require
heightened scrutiny of statutory arrangements for returning a
child from foster to biological parents. 202 As the Court noted in
Smith, "the usual understanding of 'family' implies biological
relationships, and most decisions treating the relation between
parent and child have stressed this element." 203 And even Moore,
for all its expansive language, contrasted the situation in Moore
with that in Belle Terre and identified the overriding distinguishing factor as the regulation of the family in Moore and "only
unrelated individuals" in Belle Terre. 204 Nor is the emphasis on
blood relationships wholly irrelevant to the underlying reasons
for protecting the family. Whichever familial function we single
out-the family's responsibility for feeding, clothing, and educating society's young or the family's provision of a sanctuary in
which intimate relationships may be developed and expressed
without undue interference by the state-it will be best performed by a stable, identifiable agency. Society's experience is
generally thought to have been that such an agency is most likely
to flourish when its members are bound by sentiments and beliefs
about the ties of blood.
In summary, while our hypothesis about familial privacy has
attractive features, it is, standing alone, unpersuasive.
5. The Right of Marital Privacy
Hypothesis: It may be inferred from the recognition of marital
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut and from the explicit attribution of privacy rights to the individual in Eisenstadt v. Baird that
the Constitution guarantees both married and unmarried couples
202. It is quite another [thing] to say that one may acquire such an interest
in the face of another's constitutionally recognized liberty interest that derives from
blood relationship, state law sanction, and basic human right-an interest the
foster parent has recognized by contract from the outset.
431 U.S. at 846.
203. 431 U.S. at 843 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
204. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 497, 498 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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the right to express "the most intimate concerns of an individual's
personal life" unhindered by governmental regulation.

Marriage is, of course, the paradigm "privacy" relationship.
Not only did the first modern privacy opinions-Griswold and
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe-involve married couples, but
that fact was central to the several rationales for the privacy right
in those cases. Both the "unreasonable search" and the
"association" arguments were enhanced by invocations of society's special regard for marriage, most memorably in Justice
Douglas's rhetorical question about "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms." 205
Why does society shield the married couple from the government's supervision, and is there any reason unmarried couples
should not also be shielded? Of course, marriage is a stable, identifiable institution responsible for raising and socializing children. But society protects married couples who have not_ had
children, who will not have children, or whose children have left
home. Society does so because marriage is also the institution
within which a couple can conduct "the most intimate concerns
of an individual's personal life." 206 Intimate emotional ties, cemented by and expressed through sexual relations, are widely
thought overridingly important and especially vulnerable when
exposed to the public's gaze. Of course, society has traditionally
sought to promote and preserve these intimate relationships
through marriage, as the Court's celebrated pronouncement in
Eisenstadt v. Baird concedes: "It is true that in Griswold the
right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship."
However, that pronouncement continued:
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
205. Griswold v. Connectic-!)t, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
206. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.-S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), the Court reaffirmed the centrality of marriage and the
fundamental importance of the freedom to enter into it. In that case, the Court declared
unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute forbidding any Wisconsin resident to marry without
court permission if he was obligated by a court order to support any minor issue not in
his custody. 434 U.S. at 375. The Court cited with approval "the leading decision of this
Court on the right to marry," Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967): "The freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." 434 U.S. at 383.
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matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child. 207

Though that pronouncement's logical relationship to the holding
in the case was questionable when the case was decided, 20M the
proposition, has now been so widely cited as to live a life of its
own. 209 And though Eisenstadt speaks of privacy in the decision
whether to bear a child, a similarly strong interest in privacy in
sexual matters has been acknowledged by lower courts. 210 Thus,
in Cotner v. Henry, 211 which overturned a husband's conviction
on a sodomy charge, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
wrote: "The import of the Griswold decision is that private, consensual, marital relations are protected from regulation by the
state through the use of a criminal penalty. " 212 The constitutional
significance of the right to express fully one's personality and
individuality was detailed by Justice Marshall in his dissent in
Kelley v. Johnson: 213
An individual's personal appearance may reflect, sustain, and
nourish his personality and may well be used as a means of expressing his attitute and lifestyle . . . . To say that the liberty
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not encompass matters of personal appearance would be fundamentally inconsistent
with the values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal
integrity that I have always assumed the Constitution was designed to protect.214

Taking the cases preserving the right of privacy in sexual matters
together with Eisenstadt, it can be proposed, as the Arizona
Court of Appeals has, that
no sound argument can be made that the right of privacy in sexual
conduct between consenting adults is "fundamental" only when
the consenting adults are married to each other. The right of pri207. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis original).
208. See text at notes 45-49 supra.
209. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685-87 (1977).
210. This Note does not treat judicial attitudes toward the regulation of homosexuality. For a brief attempt to establish a possible distinction between state regulation of
homosexuality and nonmarital heterosexual activity, see note 225 infra and accompanying
text.
211. 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
212. 394 F.2d at 875 (footnote omitted).
213. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
214. 425 U.S. at 250-51. These comments were made in dissent, but the decision of
the Court may be at least partly explained in terms of the special difficulties of the case,
which held that the state has a right to regulate the length of policemen's hair, Given the
rigidities of the two-tier approach, the Court may have been afraid it would become
involved in detailed examination of endless minor infringements of a right to regulate
personal appearance.
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vacy i~ deemed fundamental because it is basic to the concept of
the individual in our American culture and because it is a necessary prerequisite to the effective enjoyment of all our other fundamental rights. As Eisenstadt and its progeny have recognized, . ·
these reasons are wholly unrelated to the existence vel non of a
marriage relationship. 215

The argument, then, is this: Marriage exists to facilitate ~he
expression of emotional and sexual intimacy. That intimacy .is so
fundamental to individual liberty that it demands constitutjonal
protection. Nothing is different about the psychological and emotional needs of unmarried couples which would justify denying
them the same protection: 216
But if society genuinely recognizes the centrality to personal
liberty of the right to nonmarital sexual relations, would not our
traditions reflect that recognition? In other words, does this argu 7
ment flunk the "traditions and collective conscience" test? 217 It
does not. First, even when laws confining sex to marriage were
enforced, they were widely broken, 218 and they have not been
systematically enforced for years. 219 This nonenforcement may
well amount to the state's tacit concession that its citizens believe
privacy and autonomy in sexual relations are of paramount importance. 220 In other words, there is a traditional regard for the
215. State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147, 1151 (1975), revd. sub nom.
State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976).
·
216. One could respond to this argument by saying that, while the argument might
justify overturning laws against cohabitation, it cannot justify overturning fornication
laws, since while living together might be analogous to marriage, a one-night relationship
hardly is. However, that argument has more formal logic than practical utility. For instance, what would prevent a couple accused of fornication from claiming that; but for
their arrest, they were beginning a long-term, and therefore protected, relationship. Nor
does it seem likely that any sensible, workable line could be drawn specifying the number
of days a couple had to spend together to establish a "marriage-like" relationship. Of
course, none of this brings into question the permissibility of laws against prostitution,
since prostitution's commercial element, we societally have assumed, makes the intimacy
we wish to protect impossible.
217. See text at notes 71-84 supra.
218. See notes 2-3 supra.
219. See note 97 supra.
220. A national survey commissioned by Time and conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly
& White found:
In general, 70% [of the sample] subscribed to the statement that "there
should be no laws, either federal or state, regulating sexual practice." The majority
included all categories, Catholic and Protestant alike, old as well as young: Later
in the survey, when asked whether they favored eliminating or maintaining "laws
which regulate what kinds of sexual practices are acceptable and legal," a solid
49%-to-42% plurality wanted them eliminated.
·
The one apparent exception is pornography • • . . No less than 74% supported
the view that "the Government should crack down more on pornography in movies,
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importance of sexual relations which has simply not been expressed in legislation, probably because no cohesive group has a
powerful motive to work for the repeal of laws which are rarely
enforced and because there are cohesive groups (often religious)
which would vehemently oppose repeal. In fact some states have
repealed fornication and cohabitation statutes, 221 alld that barometer of enlightened legal opinion, the Model Penal Code,
omitted such provisions. 222 Second, while nonmarital sexual activity has always been with us, in this century sex has begun to
be thought the pervasive, underlying human motivation. However professional psychologists may have revised the original
Freudian analysis, its essential elements, at least in a vulgarized
form, have altered our social perspective and elevated the pursuit
of individual fulfillment through sexual activity to a new dignity.
Finally, society may have always recognized the fundamental
importance of the right to sexual expression but believed there
were reasons for channelling it in marriage. Whether state interests justify regulation of sexual expression outside of marriage is
discussed in detail below. 223
Several of the "rights" discussed in earlier sections lack limiting principles. The right to sexual relations outside of marriage
suffers only slightly from this defect. Such a right does not inevitably imply a right to whatever "lifestyle" one chooses, since sex
is a uniquely potent and intimate expression of personality. A
policeman forbidden to wear long hair has not suffered a diminution of his ability to express profound emotional needs in a degree
remotely.approaching that of a person barred from sexual expression. Nor would a right of sexual expression outside marriage
necessarily conflict with Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, even
assuming that that case approves laws prohibiting sodomy,m
since homosexuality can be distinguished from heterosexuality in
terms of the very societal traditions which necessitate a right to
sexual freedom. In other words, homosexuality may fail the
"traditions and collective conscience" test, since, however
books and nightclubs. Of these, 54% said they felt this strongly.
TIME, Nov. 21, 1977, at 115.
221. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.040 (1970) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1980 by ch. 166,
§21, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 219); CAL. PENAL CODE § 269a (West 1970) (repealed by ch.
71 §5, 1975 Cal. Stats. 131); IND. CODE § 35-1-82-2 (1971) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 148,
§24, 1976 Ind. Acts 718); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-928 (1943) (repealed by Legis. Bill 38, §328,
1977 Neb. Laws 88).
222. MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment at 207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
223. Parts ill.B. -ill.C. infra.
224. See notes 61-69 supra and accompanying text.
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wrongly, Americans have long regarded (and still do regard)
homosexuality with special reprobation. 22.5
We have hypothesized that the right of marital privacy logically extends to unmarried couples. That hypothesis, this Note
proposes, is valid.
6. The Right of Decisional Privacy
Hypothesis: It may be inferred from Roe v. Wade that individuals
have a right to make without governmental interference important
and intimately personal decisions, including the decision to have
sexual relations outside marriage.

Roe v. Wade, 226 which established the right to terminate a
pregnancy, rests on a singularly hazy rationale. 227 The Court, citing the usual privacy cases, concluded,
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or . . . in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 22x

From the discussion following that quotation, one might infer
that the right grows out of the woman's right to control her own
body or out of her right to escape the mental and physical distress
of bearing an unwanted child.
The familial and marital privacy cases have already been
discussed. 229 A right to control one's person dates from Union
Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 230 which spoke movingly of commonlaw limits on the power of courts to order medical examinations
of plaintiffs in civil suits. 231 In Roe, however, the Court noted that
it has refused to recognize an unlimited right to control one's own
225. This is not to deny that there is a tension between, on one hand, establishing a
right to full sexual expression for most members of society on the grounds that they need
it to fulfill their individuality, and, on the other, barring the rest from any kind of sexual
expression which appeals to them. It is to say that, however unjustifiably, homosexuality
is still widely regarded as a threat to social stability and to psychological health in a way
that even heterosexual misconduct is not. Homosexuality thus is more difficult to regard
as cherished by our national traditions and collective conscience.
226. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
227. See Ely, supra note 51.
228. 410 U.S. at 153.
229. Parts II.B.4-5 supra.
230. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
231. Rules 35 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure moot the question as to
federal courts. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1944). Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104 (1964), extended the requirement to submit to a medical examination to all
parties.
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body2.12 and doubted that such a right "bears a close relationship
to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions."2.13 Roe may nevertheless imply a limited right to bodily
privacy where intimate decisions concerning important aspects of
one's personality are affected. Thus the decision whether to have
an abortion may be distinguished, one commentator writes, from
"a forced needle in the arm, [which,] while undoubtedly requiring some public justification, may interfere with my autonomy,
but [which] hardly offends the intimacy of my personal identity
. . . . "2.14 This limiting principle provides a sensible if somewhat
imprecise stopping place for what would otherwise be an illimitable and implausible right.
That a woman to whom an abortion is forbidden suffers cannot by itself justify the decision in Roe-even wise laws may
cause distress. The relevance of the hardships listed by the
Court2.15 is that they are so great and so intimately personal that
they bring abortion within that category of privacy defined by the
Court in Whalen v. Roe236 as "the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions." The Court reiterated the centrality of the freedom to make a decision in private
matters in Carey v. Population Services International. z:17 As the
dissenting member of the three-judge panel in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney wrote,
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Due Process Clause . . . protects the right of individuals to make personal
choices, unfettered by arbitrary and purposeless restraints, in the
private matters of marriage and procreation. Roe v. Wade . , . Doe
v. Bolton . . . Griswold v. Connecticut . . . . I view those cases
as standing for the principle that every individual has a right to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's decisions on private matters of intimate concern. A mature individ232. 410 U.S. at 155 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccina•
tion); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization)).
233. 410 U.S. at 155.
234. Gerety, supra note 29, at 275 n.153.
235. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child
into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved.
410 U.S. at 153.
236. 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
237. 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977).
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ual's choice of an adult sexual partner, in the privacy of his or her
own home, would appear to me to be a decision of the· utmost
private and intimate concern.238

Like the woman's decision in Roe, the decision to engage in nonmarital sexual relations "pertain[s] to . . . one's deepest nature";239 may, if improperly resolved, inflict significant psychological damage; involves complex circumstantial and ethical problems perhaps best evaluated by the individual rather than the
state; 240 and implicates the kinds of basic human relationships of
which the Court has been solicitous.
Given these similarities, the hypothesis is plausible. Nevertheless, as the vagueness and frailty of the rationale in Roe suggest, the absence of precise criteria for identifying protected decisions might discourage the Court from developing this right and
should cause us to doubt that this hypothesis creates a
fundamental right.
There remains the logical inference from the decisions banning state interference with t}J.e use of contraceptives and abortion: What is the point of a right to use contraceptives and have
abortions without the right to sexual intercourse? Members of the
Court have denied that their decisions have settled the question. 241 However, a persuasive resolution of any conflict may be
inferred from the Court's comment in a somewhat different context in Carey u. Population Services International:
"It would be plainly unreasonable to assume that [the state] has
prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child [or the
physical and psychological dangers of an abortion] as punishment
for fornication." We remain reluctant to attribute any such
"scheme of values" to the state.242

To put it another way, we may say that (with some qualifications)
the Court has forbidden states to prevent citizens from using
contraceptives or having abortions, not because the Court approves of using contraceptives or abortions or because it approves
238. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. i975) (Merhige, J., dissenting), affd. mem.,
425 U.S. 901 (1976).
239. Definition #2 of intimate, THE AMErucAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE '686 (1969).
240. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 933:
Regarded therefore as part of a series of decisions allocating to the woman the
essentially unfettered choice of whether to bear a child, Roe v. Wade represents less
of a decision in favor of abortion than a decision in favor of leaving the matter . . .
to women rather than to legislative majorities . . .. So understood, the abortion
decision again seems less problematic than it might otherwise appear.
241. See text at note 62 supra.
242. 431 U.S. 678, 695 (1977) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)).
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of the act which makes them necessary, but because such laws
intrude harshly on personal autonomy by increasing the likelihood that the female partner would have to bear, and the couple
raise, a child. However, the physical, emotional, and financial
imposition of laws prohibiting fornication and cohabitation are so
much milder than those of laws prohibiting contraception and
abortion that it is not possible to say that the Court's disapproval
of the latter requires it to disapprove the former.
C.

"Sexual Privacy" as a Fundamental Right

The preceding pages have argued that a fundamental right
of sexual privacy may be inferred from the right of marital privacy. They have also argued that several other lines of reasoning
support a right to sexual privacy, but not convincingly enough to
persuade us that such a right is fundamental. The presence of
these other lines of reasoning, however, reinforces the inference
from marital privacy cases of a fundamental right to sexual privacy. For while we have examined each line of argument separately, we must never forget that it is a whole constitution we are
expounding. The recurring concern in constitutional interpretation for individual autonomy in intimate and personal decisions
reinforces our conclusion that the right of sexual privacy is among
the "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' " 243
and is therefore fundamental.
Indeed, for the Justice who has, outside of dictum, spoken
most directly on our problem, it is this general, recurring pattern
which apparently dictated his conclusion that, in a state which
had no law against fornication or cohabitation, a public library
could not fire an employee for living with a man to whom she was
not married and their illegitimate child. In dissenting from a
denial of certiorari in Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 244
Justice Marshall wrote: "Although we have never demarcated the
precise boundaries of [the right to privacy], we have held that
it broadly encompasses 'freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life."245 He then cited privacy cases from
most of the categories this Note has analyzed. 246
243. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quot•
ing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
244. 99 S.Ct. 734 (1978). See note 21 supra.
245. 99 S.Ct. at 736.
246. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 636, 639-640
(1974)(pregnancy). See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), and Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-385 (1978)(marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
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"SEXUAL PRIVACY" AND THE STATE INTERESTS

A. The Proper Measure of the State Interests
Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by
a "compelling state interest" . . . and that legislative enactments
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. m

The Court has generally accepted this measure of the governmental interest necessary to sustain an infringement of a
"fundamental right," but it is common learning that the formula
has meant something slightly different than the words denote,
since almost without exception, where the Court has judged a
right fundamental, it has judged the governmental interest not to
be compelling. 248 Roe v. Wade is an exception: in the later stages
of pregnancy compelling state interests override a woman's fundamental right to choose an abortion. The legitimacy of the interests in Roe-the state's interest in "potential life" and in the
mother's health-was well established. State interests have typically been found noncompelling not because the interest is impermissible, but because the means chosen do not narrowly, or even
genuinely, promote that interest. 249 The outcome-determinative
quality of the procedure has been widely criticized as excessively
rigid and an impediment to sensitive decisions; in equal protection cases, where the Court has traditionally used an analogous
formula, the Court may have become more flexible. 250 At present,
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942) (procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453-454; id., at 460, 463-465 (White J., concurring in result), and Carey
v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-685 (1977)(contraception);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at
399 (child rearing and education); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-153 (1973) (abortion); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(right to determine family living arrangements).
99 S.Ct. at 736.
247. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
248. Justice Powell describes the compelling state interest test as "so severe that
legislation rarely can meet it." Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 705 (1977).
249. See, e.g., Justice White's concurring opinion in Griswold: "I wholly fail to see
how the ban on the use of contraceptives by married couples in any way reinforces the
State's ban on illicit sexual relationships," and his subsequent dissection of the state's
claim to the contrary. 381 U.S. at 505-07.
250. The foremost critic and chronicler of the Court's handling of the fundamental
rights/compelling state interest problem is Professor Gerald Gunther. See Gunther, supra
note 11. Justice Marshall has been an outspoken advocate on the Court of a more flexible
approach in this area. See, e.g., his dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973).
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however, the elements of a "compelling" state interest are ill
defined, and classifying state interests is -a hazardous enterprise.
B. The State Interests
This Part first examines the state interests fornication and
cohabitation statutes may serve and asks whethel' those interests
are "compelling." The Part then scrutinizes the statutes in light
of the constitutional requirement that they actually further a
compelling interest.
1. Prevention of Illegitimacy

The state has what must surely be a compelling interest in
preventing the birth of illegitimate children as a means of protecting children from the disadvantages which often accompany
illegitimacy. 251 These disadvantages include the stigma which
society has, however unjustly, assigned to illegitimate children.
But what is more important is that illegitimate children are probably more frequently than legitimate children deprived of the
stable emotional and financial support which the statesupervised family is supposed to provide. That this interest is
appropriate seems clear, since these children cannot protect
themselves. That the interest is compelling also seems clear, since
no other entity than the state can be relied on to protect them.
Of course, children born out of wedlock may be well cared for
by their parents, and of course states could attempt to promote
this interest by passing and enforcing laws strictly requiring all
parents to assume complete responsibility for the well-being of
their children. But when those who are responsible for a child are
identified before the child is born, when that identification is
made without the necessity of legal action (as in a bastardy proceeding), and when there are no social pressures on the parents
not to acknowledge the child, the state is far better situated to
ensure proper care for the child, and the child is far more likely
to receive it. For example, the interests of children of unmarried
couples are not protected by a court when the parents separate.
In addition, it is a reasonable hypothesis that many couples who
do not marry decide not to do so because they doubt they will
want to live together permanently, and that children born to such
couples would be more likely than the children of married parents
251. But see Comment, All in the "Family": Legal Problems of Communes, 7 HAnv.
C.R.-C.L. L. R.Ev. 393, 408-10 (1972).
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to suffer the unhappiness of having only one parent. 252 Finally, if
these suppositions ·about the relative vulnerability of illegitimate
children to social and financial distress are correct, such children
are more likely than legitimate offspring to burden the state fisc.
2.

Preservation of the Family

The importance of the family is conceded, even glorified, by
the cases holding that familial privacy is a fundamental right. If
the family is as crucial a social institution as those cases and the
arguments in Parts II. B. 4-5 suggest, the state has a compelling
interest in preserving it. In view of these cases, and as the discussion above of the problems of illegitimate children illustrates, the
family performs several basic societal functions, most notably
raising children. 253 The state's interest in protecting its "agent"
is plain.
3. Health
The present high incidence of venereal disease obv,iously and
seriously threatens health, especially the health.of the adolescent.
If enforced, laws prohibiting nonmarital sexual activity would, by
reducing the number and promiscuity of sexual encounters, presumably decrease the incidence of the disease. The legitimacy
of the state interest is attested to (though that legitimacy seems
clear enough) by the common conditioning of the fundamental
right to marry on blood tests for venereal disease. 25 ~ The state's
interest is compounded by the danger to children of parents who
have a venereal disease. Preserving the public's health is among
the classic police powers, was recognized as compelling in Roe v.
Wade, 255 and should be compelling in this context.
4.

Morality

The state's interest in promoting "morality," including sex252. This does seem a reasonable hypothesis. But neither is it an unreasonable hypothesis that children also suffer whose parents stay together only because of pressures
the state imposes on them. In other words, we are again reminded how intractable the
Court must find the task of assaying the state's interests.
253. "The state's interest in fostering marriage as a device for record-keeping and for
establishing and enforcing domestic and financial responsibilities is not insignificant. The
interest in preserving the traditional family unit as the basic functioning unit of society
has also been lauded . . . . " Note, supra note 22, at 739.
254. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (dictum).
255. 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973).
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ual morality, is another classic police power. As Justice Harlan
wrote in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman:
the very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns
indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned
itself with the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to
attempt a line between public behavior and that wbich is purely
consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of subjects with which every society in civilized times
has found it necessary to deal. 256

The Court recently confirmed in an obscenity case that "a legislature could legitimately act . . . to protect 'the social interest in
order and morality.' " 257 However, the Court discerned no fundamental rights in that case, so it did not need to decide whether
the state interest in morality is compelling.
Given the Court's disposition not to find an interest compelling in the face of a fundamental right, and given the arguments
that follow in this paragraph, the state interest in "morality"
should not be found compelling in the context of sexual privacy.
First, even the most ardent modern advocate of "the enforcement
of morals," 258 Lord Devlin, limited the state's scope:
It is not nearly enough to say that a majority dislike a practice;
there must be a real feeling of reprobation . . . . [I]t can be
argued that if [intolerance, indignation, and disgust] or something like them are not present, the feelings of society cannot be
weighty enough to deprive the individual of freedom of choice,25°

That depth of feeling as to fornication and cohabitation has apparently been lost. 260 Second, if the fundamental right to sexual
privacy is based on the individual's right to determine the propriety of a sexual relationship, is not the state excluded from the
decision at least as to morality ex hypothesi? That is, does not
the right of sexual privacy (as we have defined it) necessarily
imply that the morality of an adult heterosexual relationship is
a question which may be decided by the parties themselves? Is
not the purport of the fundamental right that when the opinion
256. 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961).
257. Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 668,
572 (1942) (emphasis added by the Court in Roth)).
258. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). His foremost antagonist is
H.L.A. Hart, writing in LAw, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963). The classic statements of the
debate are J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), and J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY
(1837).
259. P. DEVLIN, supra note 268, at 17.
260. See notes 97 & 220-21 supra.
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of a legislature and the individual conflict on an issue of
(hetero-)sexual privacy, the decision and its moral consequences
are the individual's to choose? Could there be a fundamental
right to make what in the eyes of the state is an immoral choice?
Would not a right which permitted such a choice fail the "traditions and collective conscience" test? 261 Third, despite the far
more troubling moral aspects of the decision to have an abortion,
the Court in Roe v. Wade did not mention any state interest in
regulating morality. May we not infer that the Court saw no
compelling interest in morality to be weighed against the
woman's privacy right, and that, a fortiori, 262 no such interest
outweighs the right to sexual privacy?
C. An Evaluation of the State Interests

The above paragraphs suggest that three governmental interests are "compelling"-the interests in deterring illegitimacy,
preventing disease, and preserving the family. Do fornication and
cohabitation statutes actually serve these interests? The answer
depends on an analysis of the statutes' effectiveness which a court
is ill-equipped to make. These laws are intended to deter conduct
already discouraged by societal, nonlegal sanctions and pressures, and it must always be difficult to discern whether that
behavior which is deterred is deterred by the law or by mores. A
legislature might commission studies gauging the laws' effectiveness or the effectiveness of alternative, less offensive laws; a court
cannot. Were the privacy right not fundamental, surely the Court
would defer in so uncertain a field to the superior facilities of the
state legislature and to its sense, politically informed, of the wisest balance of the competing interests. However, the right is fundamental, and the Court must, in the absence of unusually
wealthy, industrious, and ingenious litigants, speculate on several difficult empirical problems.
It might be first argued that, while the functions the family
is thought to serve must be performed in some way, the family
261. Against this reasoning it might be said that it collapses the fundamental right
and compelling state interest tests. It does so, however, only as to the state interest in
morality, for while the state can acknowledge that some kinds of decisions so intimately
affect an individual that only he can make moral choices about them, it is not conceivable
that the state could be asked £o ignore its obligations to protect the young, to prevent the
spread of disease, and to maintain social stability. Thus it will always be proper to ask if
a fundamental right conflicts with those obligations.
262. It is a fortiori because the issues of when life begins and what constitutes ending
it are societally and personally more serious than issues of sexual morality.
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may not be needed to perform them (and hence that fornication
statutes are not necessary to serve that compelling purpose).
Some of those who break cohabitation and fornication laws have
done and will do so because they believe that the family should
be replaced as the primary unit of social organization. 263 Nevertheless, our societal.esteem for the family is so de~ply engrained,
the Court's cases are so thoroughly agreed in approving that esteem, and, especially, the empirical questions are so recalcitrant,
that the Court should affirm that protecting the family is a compelling state interest.
Nevertheless, precisely how fornication laws further that
state interest is rarely explained. The theory is apparently this:
The importance of marriage and the family is recognized symbolically, and those institutions are made more attractive, by restricting the privileges of sexual relations and raising a family to
them. The accuracy of this theory is unclear-making the privilege of sexual relations contingent upon marriage may only encourage people to marry when their primary motive is not to
produce a stable family but to enjoy the privilege; making trial
marriages impossible might only keep single those who would be
excellent parents and spouses. And if fornication and cohabitation laws _are truly part of a system of legislation regarding the
family and sexual conduct which symbolically and practically
nurtures marriage and the family, why do states typically fail to
take such laws seriously?264 Further, the state has constitutionally
inoffensive, and possibly more effective, ways of furthering this
interest, as through tax incentives. Thus the state interest in the
family offers scant justification for retracting the conclusion in
the preceding Part that laws criminalizing fornication and cohabitation are constitutionally impermissible.
The state interests in preventing illegitimacy and venereal
disease can be discussed together, since they raise substantially
the same problems of enforcement. If laws prohibiting sex between unmarried people were effectively enforced they would, of
course, prevent the birth of illegitimate children and decrease
venereal disease. If, however, legislation less violative of privacy
rights could be contrived, it would be constitutionally preferable.
But the possible alternatives are likely to be ineffective, offensive,
or both. The least offensive alternative would be an educational
263. See, e.g., text at notes 168-73 supra.
264. See note 97 supra. For a somewhat fuller treatment of this question, see text at
notes 271-73 infra.
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program, but even the most vigorous education would probably
be ineffectual, unless we are to credit the theory that most illegitimate ·births and instances of venereal disease result from ignorance of contraceptives and prophylactics or of how to obtain
them. (Given the psychological reasons people do not use contraceptives, the exigencies of passion, and the perennial optimism
of human nature, this seems unlikely.) If the cogent, insistent,
and frightening arguments of the Surgeon General and the American Cancer Society cannot dissuade us from tobacco, what hope
is there for governmental preaching about an even more compelling vice? (Many schools already have sex education courses. If
illegitimacy and venereal disease are now rife, how effectively do
these courses discourage illicit, or at least incautious, sexual
activity?) The Court might also wonder about the side effects of
such a program and about society's willingness to adopt it. Might
an active public campaign offend the many members of the public to whom public discussions of sex, illegitimacy, and venereal
disease are vulgar and disturbing? 265 And in this especially sensitive area, might a parent be able to object that sex-education
programs in schools violate their familial-privacy right to control
their children's education?
Other alternatives are also offensive or constitutionally impermissible. States have hitherto relied on fear of nature's own
sanctions-disease and children-to deter sexual carelessness.
But the Court's decisions in the abortion and contraceptives cases
have prohibited the state from strengthening those sanctions by
denying its citizens contraceptives and abortions. States have
also disadvantaged illegitimate children in the hope of encouraging couples to reproduce only within marriage, but the Court has
also disapproved this tawdry device. 266 Constitutional difficulties
aside, programs to punish parents of illegitimate children or victims of venereal disease could only be counterproductive. Punishing parents would defeat the purpose of deterring illegitimacy
(that is, insuring psychologically and financially secure homes for
children). Punishing those with venereal disease would cripple
programs to find and treat victims.
If there are no acceptable alternatives to fornication and cohabitation statutes as means of preventing disease and illegitimacy, we must confront the question-whether these laws them265. Compare this with the state's legitimate interest in "the quality of life and the
total community environment." Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973).
266. E.g., New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
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selves work in fact, not just in theory. The Court, we have seen,
cannot reliably answer that question, but it should be able to
make a shrewd guess that these laws are simply unenforceable.
Even in Colonial America, where laws forbidding fornication had
far more public support, they were not successfully enforced. 207 As
Bentham expressed the difficulty: "With what ch.ance of success
. . . would a legislator go about to extirpate drunkenness and
fornication, by dint of legal punishment? Not all the tortures
which ingenuity could invent would compass it . . . ." 208 And
even in sexually repressive Victorian England, even the leading
spokesman for law as an expression of morality conceded in
speaking of fornication statutes:
A law which enters into a direct contest with a fierce imperious
passion, which the person who feels it does not admit to be bad,
and which is not directly injurious to others, will generally do more
harm than good; and this is perhaps the principal reason why it is
impossible to legislate directly against unchastity, unless it takes
forms which every one regards as monstrous and horrible. 260

Modern scholars share this skepticism. 27° Finally, may not the
Court look to the behavior of the states which pass and would
have to defend such laws to see how much faith they have in and
how much they rely on these laws? Fornication and cohabitation
statutes are rarely enforced; when they are, it is often for reasons
other than to accomplish the ends by which the state defends
them. 271 Apparently the states themselves doubt either the efficacy or the necessity of these laws.
This is not to say, of course, that states have chosen not to
enforce these laws explicitly because of that doubt. The decision
not to enforce is more likely to be made by local officials and for
many reasons. The police have limited resources and may wish
to spend those resources enforcing the many more serious crimes
which have more clearly harmful effects and which there is more
popular sentiment and even agitation for enforcing. Police may
also be influenced by the general respectability of many of the
267. Flaherty, Law and Morals in Early America, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 244 (1971).
268. Quoted in id. at 250.
269. J. STEPHEN, supra note 258, at 152 (1967 ed.) (first published in 1837),
270. E.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 312 (1968 paperback ed.),
271. See note 97 supra. The drafters of the Model Penal Code reached a similar
conclusion. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 C0LUM, L. REv. 669,
674 (1963). Of course, if a state did choose to enforce these laws systematically, it would

be possible to study more productively their effectiveness, and these inferences from the
state's inaction would not have to be relied on.
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people who break fornication and cohabitation laws, by the feeling that when a law has fallen so thoroughly into desuetude it
would be unfair to enforce it (especially with the selectivity which
would presumably be necessary in some jurisdictions), and, possibly, by some sense that only he who is without guilt should be
casting stones. But what these reasons have in common is the
assumption that the need to enforce these laws is exceedingly
mild and that, given the usual choice of enforcing these laws or
serving one of the many competing interests, the competing interest prevails. 272 That result hardly comports with the contention
that these laws effectively serve a compelling state interest.
One might respond that those laws also serve which stand
and wait-that these laws by their presence on the books are a
symbolic expression of society's attitude toward nonmarital sexual activity. But what citizen could take as a serious statement
of community sentiment a law the community allowed to be so
often flouted? Further, the chance that these laws serve as any
such statement is diminished by the fact that a number of people
do not even know such laws exist. 273
In sum, since a fundamental right is diminished by laws
forbidding fornication and cohabitation, and since the states
themselves, who are in a position to know, tacitly concede the
inefficacy of such laws, the Court would be justified in finding
that they do not serve a compelling state interest, and declaring
them unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION

Over these complexities broods the specter of Lochner and
the problems of constitutional interpretation it represents. Those
problems are more than usually perplexing for this Note's topic.
Each of the steps in the argument that laws prohibiting fornication and cohabitation are unconstitutional is uncertain. In discussing whether the privacy right includes what we have called
sexual privacy, the Court is trapped between the Scylla of a definition of privacy too narrow to protect important rights and the
Charybdis of a definition too broad to be meaningful or wise.
To ward off judicial subjectivity, the Court has devised several tests to be used in evaluating a privacy right. But each of
272. While the privacy in which the crime is customarily committed and the scarcity
of complainants may partly account for the nonenforcement of fornication laws, neither
problem would hinder enforcement of cohabitation statutes.
273. See note 97 supra.
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these tests, at least when applied to the right of sexual privacy,
presents difficulties, for essentially each asks the Court to identify and gauge society's temper and values. This is an enterprise
which, while inescapable in this and many other areas of constitutional jurisprudence, requires the Court to ask empirical questions it has neither the tools nor the training to answer. These
questions arise in applying the national conscience and traditions
test, in deciding why society accords privacy rights to certain
kinds of relationships and decisions, in determining whether sexual privacy is sufficiently analogous to other kinds of privacy that
it too should be a right, and in assessing whether fornication and
cohabitation statutes or some drastic alternative to them work.
It was, one may suppose, the failure to perceive correctly society's
temper and values that eventually caused the Lochner Court to
founder.

